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Abstract 
Intuition is by some conceived of as biased and by others 
as an important tool to make decisions in a fast paced and 
uncertain world. Yet, within social interactions, intuitively 
judging is often the only feasible option to interpret the 
content of our most important social signals, thus 
facilitating attunement to social affordances. In fact, 
humans expertly extract and use face information in an 
automatic and non-conscious fashion. Is intuition therefore 
a fundamental building block of the toolbox we need to 
adapt to the various challenges of life as social beings? How 
does this fit the notion of intuition as irrational and error-
prone?  
Among the most widely cited models of intuition 
that are engaging with these types of questions within 
contemporary psychology, are dual process theories. 
However, as the first part of this thesis will show, they do 
not suffice as general explanatory framework for intuition. 
  
 
With the surfacing of more issues regarding general dual 
process models, the explanatory value of this dualistic 
distinction diminishes. Rather than trying to ascertain in 
which way the supposed antagonists of intuition and 
analysis interact with each other, a shift in focus has been 
proposed. I therefore join the recent endeavour by a 
different stream of judgment and decision-making 
researchers, to focus on investigating functional 
characteristics of intuitive processes along different 
domains and dimensions. 
The aim of this work is to investigate the cognitive 
processing characteristics and conditions which enable the 
intuitive perception of and reaction to our most important 
objects of social judgments. To achieve this, I draw on 
several empirical investigations, as well as theoretical 
considerations. In contrast to current trends in face 
perception research, this puts the focus on the cognitive 
processes that facilitate the integration of these percepts 
into social judgments.  
  
 
The theoretical foundations of this thesis are two-
fold. Firstly, the characterization of intuition as a judgment 
and decision-making process, which operates rapidly, 
automatically, without conscious awareness of the decision 
maker and with the inclusion of some type of feeling as 
judgment signal. Secondly, the context of face perception. 
Face perception is intuitive and essential for successful 
social interactions. The processes enabling face perception 
are performed without conscious awareness or interference 
and with a surprising swiftness, considering the amount of 
multi-attribute information that needs to be integrated. The 
face perception context therefore provides a naturalistic 
context for the study of every-day type intuitive judgments. 
It further provides the opportunity to learn more about the 
cognitive processes that shape our social interactions.  
This dissertation utilizes a multi-part research 
design. It is based on the conceptual analyses of two 
popular notions of intuition in contemporary psychological 
research, namely the default-interventionist model and the 
  
 
notion of intuition as feeling based process, respectively. 
The key results of these theoretical considerations are, 
firstly, that in several instances deliberation can actually 
lead to more errors than intuitive processing, thus calling 
the generality of default-interventionist models into 
question. Secondly, the close analysis of two investigations 
into visceral signals evoked during intuitive judgments 
provides evidence that rather than a single ‘gut feeling’ 
playing a role in intuition, the type of feelings elicited in 
intuitive judgments may depend on the task or the type of 
intuitive process being engaged. It remains to be 
investigated, what types of feelings are constitutively 
linked to intuition and when they are expected to enter the 
process. 
The second part of the present thesis relies on 
empirical investigations of functional characteristics of 
intuitive social judgments, utilizing the tracking of eye 
movements as process trace. Intuition is -- by most 
definitions -- an implicit, internal, not consciously 
  
 
accessible process. More specifically, intuitively gathered 
information is integrated into mental representations that 
are thought to be constructed by a gradual, automatic, non-
conscious process. Only the result of this process enters 
awareness. This necessarily poses a great challenge for the 
study of the processing characteristics of intuitive judgment 
behavior. One answer to this challenge is to focus on 
different dimensions of operation which, can either be 
directly manipulated or investigated without needing to rely 
on the subjective awareness of the decision maker. As 
Gustav Fechner famously proposed, subjective experience 
is a physical process. Thus, measuring the physical 
properties of internal processes allows for some measure of 
access to the otherwise inaccessible subjective experience. 
In this respect, eye movement measures provide a physical 
basis for the study of internal processes.  
If I focus on the forehead region of your face to 
determine whether you furrow your eyebrows or crinkle 
your forehead, I am attending to a cue which allows me to 
  
 
gauge if you have understood my argument or I lost you in 
confusion. Noting where a person looks thus allows for 
insight into the locus of attention and thus the strategy used 
to extract meaning from the attended cue. Tracing eye 
movement in task involving intuitive processes makes it 
possible to gain insight into the information integration 
strategies supporting these strategies. 
The key results of these investigations are that 
individuals employing an intuitive strategy to judge faces 
rely on holistic information integration processes revealed 
by an attention map centralized in the stimulus space. 
Furthermore, the reliance on an intuitive processing 
strategy to judge another person depends on individual, 
internal factors, as well as external factors, such as the task 
domain. Specifically, we find that individuals use similar 
cognitive processes to judge the gender identity of a person, 
irrespective of their own sexual orientation. When it comes 
to judging the sexual orientation of another person, 
  
 
however, the reliance on an intuitive processing strategy is 
moderated by the sexual orientation of the perceiver.  
While the general efficacy of intuition will most 
likely remain a topic of ongoing debate, the social judgment 
domain offers a great opportunity for the characterization 
of intuitive processes in an ecologically valid and 
motivationally relevant context. This dissertation provides 
further evidence for the usefulness of intuitive processes in 
social judgments. Low-level visual perception of social 
cues impacts impression formation and social evaluations. 
At the same time, the relationship between visual 
perception and the social/cultural practices these visual 
processes are trained on is dynamic and bi-directional. 
Elucidating the functional characteristics and contributions 
of intuitive processes to the formation of these percepts is 
thus of fundamental importance. Not only for the furthering 
of the theoretical debate on intuition, but also to understand 
the processes which determine social evaluations. In the 
future, the thereby gained insights may become the building 
  
 
blocks for the development of techniques to overcome the 
effects of negative social evaluations.  
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I. SYNOPSIS 
One of the most famous quotes from J.W. Goethe’s seminal 
tragedy “Faust I” stems from a dialogue between the 
studious academic Dr. Faust and his subordinate Wagner. 
Therein, Dr. Faust bemoans the impossibility of 
knowledge. In an effort to describe the inner turmoil he 
feels, having studied various disciplines (Philosophy, Law, 
Medicine „and even Theology“; I, 356), only to realize 
„dass wir nichts wissen können (that we cannot know 
anything; I, 364) “, Faust says to Wagner: “Zwei Seelen 
wohnen, ach!, in meiner Brust (Oh! Two souls are living in 
my chest)”1. Feeling utterly distraught at this failure of 
knowledge or rationality (the one “soul”), Faust eventually 
turns to the dark arts to achieve the corporeal and emotional 
experience of life (the other “soul”).  
                                                 
1 Translations are my own. 
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Some two thousand years earlier, Plato described a 
comparable dualistic dilemma in his speech on Phaidros. 
Therein, the soul is symbolized as a chariot steered by a 
coachman and two steeds “of opposite kind and heritage”. 
Hindu mythology evokes similar imagery. In this view, 
consciousness is thought to be the nature of the soul and the 
driver of the chariot2. The notion of duality is evoked here 
in the form of Parāśakti (the soul’s superconscious mind) 
and Paraśiva (the soul’s inmost core), who together make 
up the essence of the immortal soul, ātman. The study of 
intuition can be traced back to this idea of a division of the 
mind into fundamentally distinct parts. In the Eastern 
tradition, an example of this is the above mentioned school 
of thought known as Vedanta. Sri Aurobindo, a yogic 
scholar, poet, musician and founder of the tradition known 
as “Integral Yoga”, draws on Vedic texts to divide mental 
                                                 
2 Kṛishṇa Yajur Veda, Maitrī Upanishad 2.5. UPM, 99 
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faculties. In keeping with Eastern philosophical tradition, 
Aurobindo conceives of a basal “thinking mind”, where 
reason and analysis are located, and an “intuitive mind” as 
a form of (self) knowledge on a “higher plane of 
consciousness”, which can only be achieved through 
(spiritual) practice. He defines intuition (smriti) as “the 
faculty by which true knowledge hidden in the mind reveals 
itself to the judgment and is recognized at once as the truth. 
It is as when one has forgotten something one knew to be 
the fact, but remembers it the moment it is mentioned 
again” (Aurobindo, 1990).3 
Western philosophical tradition, on the other hand, 
traces the study of intuition to Plato’s idea of a mind divided 
between emotionality and rationality as described in the 
                                                 
3 For a deeper look at the similarities between Eastern and Western 
philosophy see Thompson (2015) and the specific relation between 
greek philosophia and Buddhist philosophy as pertaining to Reason, see 
McClintock (2010). 
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Phaidros speech. Drawing on both eastern and western 
philosophical traditions, Swami Sivananda4 concludes:  
“Both intellect and intuition are faculties 
of the same mind. There is no break of 
continuity between them. Intuition does 
not contradict reason. It fulfills it. They 
are not exclusive of each other. Intuition 
gives the cognition of the whole. Intellect 
can only have a conceptional knowledge 
of the whole. Intuition has direct 
knowledge of the whole and intellect 
gives us analysis of parts.”  
This dualistic understanding of intuition is still reflected in 
contemporary psychological research and is one of the most 
                                                 
4 
http://sivanandaonline.org/public_html/?cmd=displaysection&section
_id=770 
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prolific domains for the study of intuition -- most notably 
by a class of theories subsumed under the name ‘Dual 
Process Theories’ (hereafter: DPT), which I will discuss in 
detail below. 
A clear definition of intuition remains elusive, 
despite the fact that different schools of thought have 
pondered over its defining features, underlying 
mechanisms and rules of application for centuries. Some 
examples of definitions that have been put forth (and are 
being tested empirically) include: 
 
• “Intuition is manifested in the fluent, holistic and 
situation sensitive way of dealing with the world” 
(Dreyfus, Drey-fus, & Zadeh, 1987).  
• “Intuition is a perception of coherence at first not 
consciously represented but which comes to guide our 
thoughts toward a ‘hunch’ or hypothesis” (Bowers, 
Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990).  
6 
 
 
• “I use the terms gut feeling, intuition, or hunch 
interchangeably, to refer to a judgment 1. that appears 
quickly in consciousness, 2. whose underlying reasons 
we are not fully aware of, and 3. is strong enough to act 
upon” (Gigerenzer, 2007). 
• “Intuition is a process of thinking. The input to this 
process is mostly provided by knowledge stored in long-
term memory that has been primarily acquired via 
associative learning. The input is processed 
automatically and without conscious awareness. The 
output of the process is a feeling that can serve as a basis 
for judgments and decisions” (Betsch, 2008, p.4). 
 
Common to these definitions are the notions of speed, the 
holistic formation of associations, and the automatic or non-
conscious formation of these holistic associations, which 
consequently inform the judgment output. These 
characteristics thus form my definition of intuition, which 
underlies the research presented in this dissertation. 
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Importantly, similarly to other colleagues (Betsch, 2008; 
Andreas Glöckner & Witteman, 2010a, 2010b), I 
understand intuition to be a container-term used to describe 
specific types of cognitive processes (namely, fast, holistic 
and automatic/non-consciously formed ones), rather than 
conceiving of intuition as a single, differentiable mental 
system or knowledge source. 
While the social domain provides rich evidence for 
everyday situations in which people rely on intuitive 
processes for the formation of judgments, impressions and 
perceptions, social intuitions are as of yet underrepresented 
in the literature on intuition. The present work therefore 
seeks to fill this gap by directly investigating intuitive 
judgment processes in the context of face perception. Since 
faces are among the most important social signals for 
humans (Adolphs, 2003; Hari & Kujala, 2009) and the 
perception of faces has repeatedly been shown to rely on 
intuitive processing (Ambady, 2010; Ambady & Weisbuch, 
2010; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011; Willis & Todorov, 
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2006), faces represent “ecologically valid objects” 
(Hammond & Stewart, 1975) for the study of intuition. Face 
perception thus provides a highly relevant and 
motivationally salient framework in which to study the 
cognitive characteristics of intuitive judgment processes; 
fulfilling an important criterion for the study of social 
judgments (Sherif & Hovland, 1961) and addressing one of 
the biggest criticisms of intuition research to date (Eiser, 
2012; Ferguson, Mann, & Wojnowicz, 2014; Gigerenzer, 
2000; Hertwig & Volz, 2013)5.  
In the following sections, I will first outline the 
theoretical foundation for the research questions that drive 
the present work, starting with a brief overview of dual 
process theories. I will then outline the framework of social 
judgment research, within which the present work is 
                                                 
5 Namely, that a large part of intuition research thus far relies on 
computationally heavy tasks restricted to the laboratory environment 
and lacking ecological validity. 
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situated, and finally discuss the most important features of 
face processing as pertaining to the research questions I 
have posed. The second section will detail the motivation 
underlying the choice of eye-tracking as a research 
methodology and introduce the most important features of 
using eye-tracking in tracing cognitive processes. The third 
section will summarize the main findings of this 
dissertation. In the fourth section, an overall conclusion of 
the dissertation is drawn. Lastly, in the outlook I make a 
first attempt at disentangling notions of embodied feelings 
in intuitive processes. 
 
1. Theoretical Foundation 
Dual Process Theories (DPT) are among the most often 
evoked models for the study of intuition, as they expound 
upon the interplay between and properties of intuitive and 
analytic processes in judgment and decision making 
(Glöckner & Witteman, 2010). Whether it be the general 
10 
 
 
concept of dual systems or the more speciﬁc concept of 
dual-processes, the notion of duality has certainly been a 
great catalyst for the production of a plethora of scientiﬁc 
evidence, especially in decision science (De Neys, 
Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; A. Glöckner & Betsch, 2008), 
social cognition (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Lieberman, 
2000, 2007) and (neuro-) economics (Kahneman, 2011; 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). While 
DPTs differ along many dimensions and predictions, 
depending largely on the arena of investigation (e.g. neuro-
economics versus social psychology), the basic premise is 
largely the same. DPT assume the existence of two 
differing types of cognitive processes that govern human 
reasoning, judgment and decision-making. These two types 
fall along a divide of: 
  
 T1: intuitive, automatic, holistic, fast 
 T2: deliberate, reflective, analytic, slow 
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DPT developed out of (and owe a great deal of their 
popularity to) the Heuristics and Biases program put forth 
by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahnemann, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982). Therein, intuition is viewed as cognitive 
short cut or heuristic which is frequently biased and thus 
leads to erroneous choices or decisions. In contrast, most 
DPT assume that in some situations, intuitive/T1 processes 
can actually lead to the more appropriate or valid answer. 
These are mostly instances where the decision maker can 
make use of “overpracticed cues” (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013a).6 
                                                 
6 Though note that a number of researchers who do not specifically 
ascribe to the DPT approach also argue for the effectiveness of intuitive 
decision-making, especially in contexts where the task is decomposable 
or information is incomplete (Betsch, 2008; Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Gaissmaier & Gigerenzer, 2006; Gigerenzer, 2007; Gore & Sadler-
Smith, 2011; Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Hogarth, 2001; Mega & Volz, 
2014). 
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The dual process approach has led to a large 
proliferation of models, which I will not detail here (for an 
excellent and timely review, see Strack and Deutsch, 2015). 
However, I do want to briefly introduce two of the most 
prominent classes of DPT, since they build part of the 
theoretical backbone of the present work. The first of these 
is dual systems theory and is considered to be among the 
more general of DPT. It makes predictions not only about 
cognitive processes in specific domains7, but rather 
assumes a general divide of mental capacities into two 
different and differentiable systems (Sloman, 2002; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). Sloman (1996, 2014) argues that 
the mind contains two independent reasoning systems, 
which use separate and different processes to operate, learn 
and change. System 1 is assumed to be “evolutionarily old” 
                                                 
7
 such as the MODE model with attitudes (Fazio, 1990) or the Cognitive 
Experiential Self Theory as theory of personality (S Epstein, 1994; 
Seymour Epstein & Pacini, 1999). 
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and “shared with other animals”, operating 
associatively and producing “quick and dirty” answers 
based on heuristics (such as representativeness or 
availability). System 2, on the other hand, is proposed to be 
a historically more recent neural development, operating in 
a rule-based fashion and able to provide explanations of the 
environment8.  
Neural correlates of intuition according to dual 
systems theory 
The ‘Social Cognitive Neuroscience’ approach 
(Lieberman, 2002; 2007) builds on dual systems theory to 
propose two distinct neural systems, thought to bring forth 
the different mental operations. These are the ‘reflexive’ 
system, comprised of the amygdala, basal ganglia, lateral 
                                                 
8 See Gigerenzer & Regier (1996) for an early critique on the problem 
of imprecision and testability of the characteristics proposed for the two 
systems by Sloman. 
14 
 
 
temporal cortex, and assumed to be responsible for non-
conscious, implicit, intuitive cognitive processes. The 
second system, called ‘reflective’, is proposed to rely on 
activation of the anterior cingulate cortex, prefrontal cortex 
and medial temporal lobe (including hippocampus), and 
assumed to bring forth conscious, explicit and rational 
thought.  
Neural correlates of intuition beyond the dual 
systems approach 
Independently of the Social Cognitive Neuroscience 
approach, Volz and her colleagues’ investigations of the 
neural architecture underlying intuitive processes paint a 
different picture (Bar et al., 2006; Horr, Braun, Zander, & 
Volz, 2015; Volz, Rubsamen, & von Cramon, 2008; Volz 
& von Cramon, 2006). For visual and auditory as well as 
semantic task domains, the authors find specific activity in 
the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) when individuals 
engage in intuitive processing. The OFC is thus proposed 
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to be a candidate region for intuitive processing carrying 
out a preliminary gist-extraction of the incomplete stimulus 
input.  
Building on these findings of the mOFC as a 
possible region of holistic and associative stimulus 
integration in intuition, we set out to directly test neural 
predictions derived from dual systems theory via functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a face perception 
task (Mega, Gigerenzer, & Volz, 2015). We chose face 
perception as the task domain, since perceiving and judging 
facial expressions can be accomplished both intuitively (i.e. 
fast and without conscious awareness of the underlying 
processes) and analytically. That is, parameters of analysis 
can be trained through the use of tools such as the micro-
expressions training tool (Ekman, 2006), wherein 
individuals are trained to detect miniscule changes in facial 
expressions during nearly sub-liminal presentation times. 
We measured functional brain activity while participants 
were specifically instructed to either intuitively (group 1) 
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or deliberately (group 2) judge the authenticity of happy 
and fearful facial expressions. Results from three different 
analyses revealed both common brain networks of 
activation across decision mode and differential activations 
as a function of strategy adherence. As outlined above, dual 
systems theories would predict differentiated activity 
within either the ‘reflexive’ or the ‘reflective’ system 
specifically for an intuitive (former) or deliberative (latter) 
condition. Contrary to the dual systems predictions, the 
results of a covariate analysis show largely overlapping 
networks for both fast and slowly responding individuals, 
namely regions of primary visual perception (cuneus, 
lingual gyrus) as well as the right OFC, fusiform gyrus and 
temporoparietal junction. We thus interpret our results as 
contradicting popular dual-systems accounts that propose a 
clear-cut dichotomy of the processing systems. 
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Dual process theories are not a general 
explanatory framework for all types of intuitive 
judgment processes 
As stated before, the general assumption of DPT is the 
existence of two qualitatively distinct process types 
(automatic ‘intuition’ and controlled ‘deliberation’ or 
‘reflection’), which are thought to underlie observable 
behavior. Contemporary uses of DPT focus on the default-
interventionist model (hereafter: D-I-model), which 
assumes that automatic, intuitive processes (Type 1) yield 
default responses unless intervention by higher order, 
reflective reasoning processes (Type 2) is needed  (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013a, 2013b). Therein, the authors split the 
attributes of both process types into defining and correlated 
features, as outlined below: 
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Figure 1: Attributes of intuitive and reflective proceses, 
split by defining and correlated features, as outlined in 
Type 1 Processes 
(intuitive) 
 
➢ Working 
memory not 
required 
➢ Autonomous 
Type 2 Processes 
(reflective) 
 
➢ Working 
memory 
required 
➢ Cognitive 
decoupling 
➢ Mental 
simulation 
Defining 
Feature 
Correlated 
Features 
(Example
s) 
- Fast 
- Non-conscious 
- Biased responses 
- Experience-based 
decision-making 
 
- Slow 
- Conscious 
-Normative 
responses 
-Consequential 
decision-making 
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Evans & Stanovich, 2013a. 
 
Despite the prevalence of dual-process models as 
explanatory frameworks for judgment and decision 
making, the “paradox of introspection” (Jonathan W 
Schooler & Schreiber, 2004) raises important concerns for 
the general applicability of DPT to the understanding of 
intuition (see Ch. IV.1 of the present work, or Mega & 
Volz, 2014).  
According to D-I-type models, T2 reﬂective 
processes are called upon to intervene on default answers 
in situations beyond those relying on innate or conditioned 
response capacities. Here, the engagement of T2 processing 
is assumed to be more likely to ﬁnd the normatively correct 
answer. Importantly (as shown in figure 1), T2 processes 
have mental simulation and cognitive decoupling as 
defining features. The introspection literature, however, 
provides ample evidence for situations in which cognitive 
decoupling (i.e. the engagement of type 2 processes) does 
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not lead to correct answers, but disrupts the judgment 
process and leads to alterations in 
judgment/preference/memory. Introspection refers to the 
ability to explicitly characterize one’s experience, i.e. to 
become meta-aware. When asked to introspect, especially 
in experimental settings, we are asked to put our internal 
experience into words. This necessarily involves a re-
representation of the contents of experience, termed 
cognitive decoupling. In one early study on the effect of 
introspective error, participants were shown a short video 
of a robbery and later tasked with recognizing the robber 
among a set of new faces. Participants who had been asked 
to describe the face prior to picking it out in a subsequent 
line-up of faces showed substantially reduced recognition 
rates compared to participants who tried to recognize the 
previously seen face without describing it first (J W 
Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Jonathan W. 
Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). Similarly, reflecting 
on the reasons for their preference of one type of jam over 
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another disrupted the actual preference, whereas 
individuals who did not reflect on the reasons for their 
preference remained with their choice (Wilson & Schooler, 
1991). Based on these and similar results in other studies 
(Jonathan W Schooler, 2002; Winkielman & Schooler, 
2011), the authors conclude that verbal overshadowing 
causes translational dissociations. Put differently, when one 
tries to verbally represent inherently non-verbalizable 
processes, disruption or distortion of the 
preference/decision can occur. “In sum, we suggest that 
reflecting about reasons will change people’s attitudes 
when their initial attitude is relatively inaccessible and the 
reasons that are salient and plausible happen to have a 
different valence than people's initial attitude” (Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991, p.4). In this way, contrary to the 
proposition of D-I-Models, the introspective error is an 
example of how re-representing subjective experience, by 
cognitively decoupling can lead to biases and incorrect 
decisions. Notably, this counterintuitive ﬁnding is not 
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limited to T1-speciﬁc situations, where over-learned cues 
elicit the right answer, but also occurs in situations where 
the problem is hard to solve directly from previous 
experience or from previously stored cue validities. In tasks 
requiring the individual to introspect, the recruitment of T2 
processes seems to elicit a dissociation between 
experiential consciousness and meta-consciousness, 
leading to (a) distortions of underlying experience (as 
demonstrated in the ‘verbal overshadowing’ phenomenon), 
(b) a decline in performance (e.g. speed), or (c) a decline in 
accuracy (e.g. recognition). The characterization of 
intuition and its interaction with other cognitive processes 
as outlined in the D-I-model may therefore represent one 
way in which intuition functions, although it certainly does 
not hold up as a general model for every type of judgment 
or decision. 
The study of intuition has recently experienced a 
divergence of research streams. It has fanned out into 
specialized research endeavors concerned with specific 
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aspects of intuition and contexts of its use, such as 
managerial decisions (Dane & Pratt, 2007), syllogistic 
reasoning (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008) and 
judgments of semantic coherence (Ilg et al., 2007; 
Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Zander, Fernandez Cruz, 
Winkelmann, & Volz, 2016), to name just a few. It seems 
as though a general unifying theory of intuition applicable 
to all aspects of human cognition/rationality may not be 
within reach – if, indeed, it will ever be reached. Some 
researchers have even gone so far as to postulate that 
intuition is in fact a blanket term used to describe different 
types of automatic processes (Andreas Glöckner & 
Witteman, 2010a). Put differently, “presumably, the ideal 
case of pure intuition or pure deliberation does not exist in 
reality” (Betsch, 2008, p.7). Rather than searching for the 
truth-value of ‘what intuition is’, I therefore concentrate on 
functionally characterizing the intuitive judgment process 
in the context of face perception. 
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1.1 Focus on Processing Characteristics  
Intuition is a type of process which many conceive of as 
relying in large part on stored experience. Thus, an agent’s 
cultural, social, environmental and situational contexts 
necessarily make up the ‘training base’ for intuitive 
processes. Coupled with the individual’s cognitive 
capacities (which, in turn, are also at least partially shaped 
by the individual’s life experience), this context-
dependency seems to further support the hypothesis that 
there cannot be one single type of intuition. Instead, one 
might conceive of different types of processing, more or 
less intuitively, in order to deal with rapidly changing 
environments. These processes may share certain 
characteristic features, but they may also diverge to suit the 
specific needs of different task domains, contexts, and 
situations. This concept of intuitive processing shares 
similarities with Hammond and colleagues’ cognitive 
continuum theory (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and 
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Pearson (1987), wherein intuition and deliberation are seen 
not as completely distinct categories of cognitive processes, 
but rather as poles of a cognitive continuum. It also shares 
similarities with the unimodel, which proposes intuition 
and deliberation to rely on similar or the same kind of rules 
(Kruglanski, 2013; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). 
Therefore, in this dissertation I will not argue for a 
generalized theory of intuition. Instead, I follow the 
suggestion of focusing on processing characteristics of 
intuition which may be shared across task domains and 
contexts (Glöckner and Witteman, 2010). The aim of the 
present work is thus the functional characterization of the 
processes by which we intuitively judge our most important 
social signals. 
1.2 Research Questions 
As discussed above, many authors generally agree that 
intuitive processing produces judgments that are based on a 
rapid and holistic perception of information and stored 
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experience, involving the retrieval of this experiential 
information from memory and its integration with 
perceived stimulus information. Intuitive judgment 
processes are thought to adapt to context and to be 
accompanied by or result in some feeling(s), which may or 
may not have a bodily component. 
I chose to focus my investigation on three of these 
aspects, which I will discuss in more detail in the next 
sections. The main research questions are: 
1) Is the default-interventionist model a general 
explanatory framework for intuitive judgment 
processes? 
2) What characterizes the intuitive processing of social 
stimuli? 
3) When is an intuitive processing strategy enlisted to 
judge social stimuli? 
4) What types of feelings are part of intuitive judgment 
processes? 
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1.3 Social Judgments 
Before attempting to answer the questions posed above, a 
brief look at the process of judgment formation is merited. 
The psychological domain of judgment and decision 
making asks questions about the type of information used 
in judgments, the ways in which this information is 
gathered and how it is integrated to form a judgment 
(Betsch, Funke, & Plessner, 2011). Although social 
judgments share many similarities with other types of 
judgments (Eiser, 2012), some important distinctions do 
exist. Most relevant for the context of this dissertation are 
the following features: 
• Many components of social judgments are 
not (or only indirectly) measurable. 
• Social judgments need to be formed using a 
wealth of different cues. 
• The perceiver and object of perception can 
interact with each other, dynamically 
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influencing both the judgment process as 
well as the object of judgment. 
Having set the stage for the types of judgments under 
investigation in this dissertation, as well as having provided 
ample evidence for why intuitive processes are uniquely 
suited to perform social judgment tasks efficiently, I will 
now outline the specific task context. 
 
1.4 Face Perception 
Face perception – the study of how and what people 
perceive in another person’s face – makes up another large 
area of research within social cognition. As early as in the 
1870s, Charles Darwin already recognized the importance 
of facial expressions as crucial regulators of behavior, 
especially in nonverbal communication (Darwin, 1872).  
More than one hundred years later, researchers are 
assembling a vastly growing body of evidence to support 
this claim in both humans and non-human primates 
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(Sherwood 2003, Tsao 2008). The importance of faces 
emerges not only in the knowledge that specialized neural 
areas have developed which activate almost exclusively 
upon encountering a face stimulus (Atkinson & Adolphs, 
2011; Bruce & Young, 1986; Jv Haxby, Hoffman, & 
Gobbini, 2000; J V Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002; 
Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003). A wider lens onto the issue shows us that 
throughout human culture and communication, faces have 
an exclusive and special function (Mega, 2015). They are 
seen as direct displays of emotion and communicative 
intent, as well as opportunities for empathy. In fact, cultural 
history studies on faces conceive of them as semantic fields 
on which such topics as beauty, mortality or social 
hierarchy are portrayed and debated (Weigel & Belting, 
2013). 
While the term intuition does surface now and again 
within face perception research, the context of face 
perception remains understudied thus far in the endeavor of 
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functionally characterizing intuitive processing in the social 
domain, as well as in everyday use. For this reason, the 
present work uses the context of face perception paradigms 
as a means of investigating intuitive judgment processes. I 
outline further details of face perception mechanisms below 
to address the specificities of face perception and 
categorization as they pertain to the individual studies 
discussed. 
2. Methodology 
Eye-tracking technology is increasingly being used to 
determine where, when and for how long perceptual, 
attentional and cognitive processes are applied to a visual 
stimulus (Henderson, Williams, & Falk, 2005; Russo, 
2011; Vo, Smith, Mital, & Henderson, 2012). It therefore 
provides an opportunity for judgment and decision-making 
researchers to use fixation-based methods as a means of 
tracing cognitive and perceptual processes. The three pairs 
of muscles surrounding the eye uniquely decide its 
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movement and orientation. This directing of the gaze to 
relevant locations in space is controlled by large parts of the 
brain (Holmqvist et al., 2011), a fact that is exploited in 
many research areas studying, for example, preference, 
judgments or (consumer) decisions.   
The most reported type of eye-tracking data are 
fixations9, which are generally considered a proxy to 
measure attention (Holmqvist et al., 2011). It is important 
to note that while strong relationships exist between eye 
movements and cognitive processes, eye tracking remains 
an indirect measure, similar – in this manner – to fMRI. To 
curb the dangers of reverse inference10, it is necessary to 
design eye-tracking studies grounded in testable theories. 
From these, corollary predictions can be drawn and 
implemented into experimental manipulations, which – 
                                                 
9 Fixation refers to a period of time in which the eye stays still 
(anywhere from around 100ms up to several seconds). 
10 For a discussion of reverse inference see (Poldrack, 2006). 
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when resulting in changes in (eye movement) behavior – 
can indicate differences in cognitive processes. The eye-
tracking compendium by Holmqvist et al. (2011) includes 
several excellent chapters on the design of eye-tracking 
studies and recommendations to avoid the most common 
pitfalls.  
In the case of the present work, the theory-based 
predictions were three-fold. Firstly, anecdotal evidence in 
previous face perception research (Armann & Bülthoff, 
2009) revealed a sub-group of participants whose fixation 
pattern was condensed and located around the center of the 
stimulus face. In a post-session questionnaire, participants 
of this sub-group reported performing the task ‘intuitively’ 
and trying to gain an ‘overall impression’. Furthermore, in 
a study using computational models to cluster eye 
movement patterns into holistic and analytic face 
recognition strategies (Chuk, Chan, & Hsiao, 2014), longer 
fixation times and a condensed fixation pattern was 
attributed to the holistic strategy. Further support for the 
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prediction of longer and less fixations in intuitive judgment 
processes comes from the study of expertise. Several 
investigations of experts in various areas such as chess, art 
and goal-keeping have found longer and fewer fixations in 
experts than in novices (Charness, Tuffiash, Krampe, 
Reingold, & Vasyukova, 2005; Savelsbergh, Williams, 
Kamp, & Ward, 2002). The authors do not interpret longer 
fixation times as a higher amount of processing in this case, 
but rather a function of processing efficiency. More 
specifically, the idea is that experts extract more 
information around the point of fixation (thus the longer 
fixation time) and therefore need less fixations overall. 
Conversely, novices, who – due to lack of skill – will 
extract less information per fixation (shorter fixations) and 
thus need more fixations overall to complete the task 
(Reingold, Charness, Schultetus, & Stampe, 2001). 
Expertise has long been associated with intuition (e.g. Dane 
& Pratt, 2007; Moxley, Anders Ericsson, Charness, & 
Krampe, 2012). Dane and colleagues confirm the amplified 
34 
 
 
effectiveness of intuitive decision-making processes for 
instances in which individuals have high levels of domain 
expertise. Examples of this include the effects of domain 
expertise on intuitive decision making in tasks such as 
judging basketball performances or identifying of 
counterfeit handbags. The authors conclude: “Domain 
experts are well equipped to capitalize on the potential 
benefits of intuition because they possess rich bodies of 
domain knowledge that foster the rapid and sophisticated 
associative processes that produce accurate intuitions” 
(Dane & Pratt, 2007). I therefore used eye movement 
analysis as a tool to trace the cognitive processing 
characteristics of intuitive judgments in face perception 
tasks. 
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3. Summary of Main Findings 
3.1 Thinking about thinking 
The first main finding of this dissertation is that the 
interplay of intuitive and deliberative processes as proposed 
by default-interventionist models does not reflect the way 
these processes interact in situations involving 
introspection. I outlined this discussion in detail within the 
theoretical background of this thesis (p. 8-11). For the full 
paper, see Ch. IV.1 of this thesis. 
 
3.2 Intuitive face judgments rely on holistic eye 
movement pattern 
Moving towards the goal of functionally characterizing 
intuitive judgment processes, the aim of the first study 
summarized below was to characterize the cognitive 
processes involved in intuitive social judgments, by 
investigating eye movement patterns in a face judgment 
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task. Eye movement strategies involved in the perception of 
faces can rely on either global or local information 
sampling patterns and observers can flexibly adapt these 
strategies (Miellet et al., 2011, 2013). This speaks for the 
importance of individual differences in face perception 
strategies, though culture has repeatedly been shown to 
modulate these strategies strongly. For example, in the 
holistic and analytical cultural framework of perceptual 
processing styles researchers found that individual 
differences in preferred fixation positions when viewing 
human faces persisted over time (see Kelly et al., 2010; 
Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006; Nisbett & Masuda, 
2007, as well as Peterson & Eckstein (2013)11. Cognitive 
                                                 
11 The holistic and analytical cultural framework is based on extensive 
evidence that individuals from Western cultures rely on categorical 
rules and analysis, whereas individuals from Eastern cultures (e.g. 
China and Japan) pay more attention to context and relationships 
between objects (Kelly et al., 2010; Yuki, Maddux, & Masuda, 2007). 
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processing styles or modes such as intuition range among 
such individual factors, which purportedly influence eye 
movement patterns during the perception of human faces. 
Thus, in keeping with the aim of characterizing intuitive 
judgment processes in the context of face perception, the 
research question underlying the present study was whether 
differences in processing style do indeed modulate eye 
movement strategies underlying the judgment of faces. 
                                                 
This holds true for the viewing of faces (wherein Caucasians seem to 
look more towards single facial features, such as the eyes, then the 
mouth, whereas Asian individuals prefer to look at the center of the 
face) as well as the perception of art and photography (T Masuda, 
Gonzalez, Kwan, & Nisbett, 2008; Takahiko Masuda, Wang, Ito, & 
Senzaki, 2012; Nisbett & Masuda, 2007). Interestingly, in an elegantly 
designed study investigating eye movement patterns of Korean children 
adopted by Swiss families, Caldara and colleagues (2016) were able to 
show that these differences in processing are shaped by cultural 
upbringing rather than genetic factors. 
38 
 
 
To this end, we studied the eye movements of two 
differentially instructed groups of participants while these 
were engaged in the judgment of facial expressions. The 
first was an ‘intuitive group’, whom we instructed to judge 
the authenticity of facial expressions relying on their “gut 
feeling” and “answering spontaneously”, and the second 
was a ‘deliberative group’, whom we instructed to judge the 
authenticity of the same facial expressions after careful 
thought, focusing especially on the eye and mouth region. 
The reliance on direct instruction is the most frequently 
used means of manipulating intuitive/deliberate processing 
modes (Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012; Horstmann, 
Hausmann, & Ryf, 2009). Rather than mentioning the 
explicit labels, the instructions usually focus on processing 
characteristics (i.e. asking individuals to decide 
fast/spontaneously, base their decision on [gut] feeling, or 
view the task holistically to induce intuitive processing) and 
ask participants to decide accordingly.  
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Intuition has been linked to a global/holistic 
processing style (K. A. Dijkstra, van der Pligt, van Kleef, 
& Kerstholt, 2012; K. a Dijkstra, van der Pligt, & van Kleef, 
2014), and – depending on the context – fixation strategies 
in face perception can rely on either global or local 
information (Millet et al., 2011; 2013). Based on this, we 
expected to find evidence for global/holistic processing in 
the intuitive, but not in the deliberate condition. If intuitive 
face judgments do indeed involve global/holistic 
processing, we predicted to find specific eye movement 
patterns for the intuitive condition that are distinct from the 
deliberative condition. More specifically, we expected the 
intuitive condition to elicit fewer fixations, but for these 
fixations to be longer than those of the deliberate condition. 
We founded these hypotheses on several theoretical 
considerations and previous empirical results.  
Firstly, in an eye-tracking task requiring 
participants to judge the femininity of presented stimulus 
faces, Armann and Bülthoff (2009) found that – without 
40 
 
 
differential instructions – two sub-groups emerged: one 
group of participants who preferentially fixated on the eye 
region, and a second group who fixated on the center of the 
face more often and for longer. Together with participants’ 
verbal reports, they interpreted the group evidencing longer 
and more centralized fixations as a separate, more holistic 
strategy. Interestingly, the participants themselves reported 
performing the task “intuitively” and as trying to gain an 
“overall impression”. Similarly, using a face recognition 
task in Asian participants, Chuk and colleagues modeled 
participants’ eye movement patterns using hidden markov 
models (HMMs; Chuk et al., 2014). By clustering the 
HMMs, the eye movements participants made during the 
test phase, in which they tried to recognize previously 
learned faces in a set of new ones, could be classified into 
either a holistic or an analytic pattern. Furthermore, the 
participants classified as analytic by the HMMs 
furthermore showed longer reaction times and produced a 
higher amount of fixations. These findings are in line with 
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literature on eye movement patterns of experts, as 
mentioned previously (p. 14ff.). Therein, longer fixation 
times are interpreted as a function of processing efficiency. 
That is, experts are thought to extract more information 
around the point of fixation (thus the longer fixation time) 
and therefore to need less fixations overall (see p. 14 for 
details). Notably, expertise (especially domain-specific) is 
linked to intuitive processing, though intuition and 
expertise are not identical.  
In this context of characterizing intuitive 
processing, the term ‘holistic’ refers to the formation of an 
overall impression akin to the formation of a ‘gestalt’ 
(Wenger and Townsend, 2001; Dijkstra et al., 2012) on the 
basis of rapidly gleaned and integrated information. This is 
in contrast to the concept of ‘holistic’ in terms of the spatial 
relationship between parts of the face, which the term is 
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often taken to denote in the context of face perception.12 It 
is important to note that older definitions of holistic face 
processing as “recognizing the face as a perceptual whole” 
(Tanka & Farah, 1993) are closer to the notion of ‘holistic’ 
in the intuition literature. Several highly cited works 
characterize intuition as a “holistically associative” process 
(Dane & Pratt, 2007; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011; 
Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008; Hogarth, 
2001). Thereby the authors intend that the holistically 
associative intuitive process integrates unstructured parts of 
stimulus information into a coherent percept, which then 
leads to action tendencies, such as making a decision or 
judgment based on the integrated information.  
                                                 
12 Note that ‚holistic‘ and ‚configural‘ processing are used 
interchangeably by many authors in the face perception literature. See 
Maurer et al. (2002) for a review and McKone et al., 2007 for a brief 
discussion of this. 
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How these holistic associations are formed remains 
unclear and, in fact, may depend on the task at hand. 
Bowers and colleagues, for example, conceive of a non-
conscious matching of the perceived stimulus information 
with exemplars stored in memory (Bowers et al., 1990). 
This concept has found wider recognition and been 
grounded in empirical evidence (Bolte & Goschke, 2005; 
Horr et al., 2015; Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Volz & 
Zander, 2014; Zander et al., 2016). Speaking about the 
cognitive architecture of intuition more broadly, Baumann 
and Kuhl, (2002) argue that upon perceiving a stimulus, 
extended associationistic networks activate automatically 
and proceed to initiate the parallel processing of 
information. This processing is conceived of as being 
holistic, implicit, and giving rise to an intuitive perception 
of coherence. In the case of face perception, the notion of 
an internal ‘face space’ (p.13ff.) might represent the 
proverbial ‘database’ against which the holistically 
sampled percept is matched rapidly and non-consciously. 
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As predicted, the intuitive condition did reveal markers of 
global/holistic processing (i.e. use of fewer diagnostic 
features/cues). These are a significantly lower number of 
fixations as compared to the deliberate condition, as well as 
a pattern of attention localized in the center of the face (for 
figures and tables see Ch. IV.1).  
Intuitive processing is often related to processing 
the ‘gestalt’ of an object rather than focusing on details. 
Thus, the formation of a global impression of a facial 
expression via fast, few, and centrally located fixations 
might well be enough to elicit a ‘gut feeling’ of the message 
we interpret the face to be sending, though the conscious 
knowledge of the specific positions of facial musculature 
eludes us. Only those having undergone explicit training 
can consciously retrieve the information about which 
muscle positions underlie what expression (Ekman, 2006). 
Miller and Ireland’s definition of intuition as “holistic 
hunch” supports this conclusion. Therein, “[i]ntuition as 
holistic hunch corresponds to judgment or choice made 
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through a subconscious synthesis of information drawn 
from diverse experiences. Here, information stored in 
memory is subconsciously combined in complex ways to 
produce judgment or choice that feels right” (Miller & 
Ireland, 2005, p. 21). Insofar as intuition and deliberation 
can be considered two different processing styles for the 
information within the faces of others, it seems quite 
plausible to postulate that intuitive and deliberative 
processing strategies will differ in the pattern of attention 
on a given face. The present study provides further 
evidence that intuitive processes rely on holistic perception, 
in an understudied and real world domain of intuition 
research. Additionally, our work adds to a growing body of 
literature demonstrating the usefulness of eye-tracking 
technology for judgment and decision-making research in 
general (e.g. Russo, 2011) and intuition in particular 
(Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009; V. a. 
Thompson, 2013). 
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3.3 Reliance on intuition depends on context and 
(life) experience 
Before moving on to the next section, I would briefly like 
to reiterate the most important points from the previous 
experiment. Drawing on studies of ‘thin slice’ judgments, I 
illustrated that evaluative judgments of facial expressions 
are biologically based and most often occur intuitively, i.e. 
automatically, outside awareness, and without drawing on 
conscious, cognitive processing resources (Ambady & 
Weisbuch, 2010). I further introduced evidence for the 
claim that the eye movement pattern with which perceivers 
intuitively judge faces shows features of global/holistic 
processing (see Ch. IV. 2 this work & Mega & Volz, under 
review). Furthermore, I showed that the tendency of 
perceivers to direct attention more towards certain 
diagnostic features of a face is task-dependent and may in 
part be due to the involvement of different cognitive 
processes (Armann & Bülthoff, 2009). In keeping with the 
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overarching goal of this dissertation, the study summarized 
in the following paragraphs was designed to investigate 
contexts of use for intuitive processing. The aim was to 
identify whether individual differences with respect to face 
perception strategies would map onto decision mode. To 
achieve this, a task context was chosen in which differences 
in cognitive style have been shown to map onto differences 
in judgments. 
Examining the politics of differences in sexual 
orientation judgments, Stern and colleagues (2013) found 
that differences in cognitive style underlie ideological 
differences in judgments of sexual orientation. Participants 
who identified as liberal in their political views engaged in 
effortful, deliberative processing. Conversely, participants 
identifying with conservative political values relied on 
intuitive processing, as evidenced by the fact that higher 
cognitive load did not disrupt their judgments. 
Additionally, liberals were less likely to use gender-
inversion cues (categorizing ‘feminine’ men and 
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‘masculine’ women as gay/lesbian, respectively). This 
raises the question whether different sexual orientations 
also map onto different cognitive styles. Specifically, one 
might speculate that individuals who identify as queer hold 
more liberal views than heterosexual individuals do. The 
‘social vision’ framework has outlined the importance of 
individual as well as social factors in the shaping of 
perceptual experience. Could differences in the cognitive 
processing strategy relied on by the perceiver contribute to 
perceiver attunement, by determining the way in which 
stimulus information becomes available?  
Brief glances at a face are sufficient for person 
categorization (Bruce & Young, 1986; M. A. Peterson & 
Rhodes, 2003). In fact, 50ms are sufficient to infer trait 
characteristics such as trustworthiness from a face (Willis 
& Todorov, 2006), and 60ms exposure are sufficient to 
correctly identify the sexual orientation when viewing 
female faces (Tskhay, Feriozzo, & Rule, 2013). Moreover, 
even single diagnostic cues are sufficient to characterize 
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another person visually. Seeing a person’s hairstyle, for 
example, suffices as a cue for sex/gender categorization 
(Martin & Macrae, 2007; Rule, Ambady, Adams, & 
Macrae, 2008). However, the reliance on information 
search strategies such as feature-based or configural visual 
discrimination depends on factors inherent to the perceiver 
(Albohn & Adams, 2016; Zebrowitz, Bronstad, & 
Montepare, 2011), such as a perceiver’s culture (Kelly et 
al., 2010) or cognitive strategy (see Ch. IV.2, this 
dissertation). From an ecological perspective, the 
perception of a person’s facial features and the extraction 
of meaning thereof guides adaptive behavior and thus 
moderates a perceiver’s sensitivity to stimulus information 
that reveals particular affordances (attunements). In fact, 
the layout of a person’s face-space (Leopold, O’Toole, 
Vetter, & Blanz, 2001; Valentine, Lewis, & Hills, 2014) is 
thought to be the function of an individual’s perceptual 
experiences. Affiliated individuals, for example, are more 
similar in their facial preferences than strangers are. 
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Presumably, this effect arises due to greater similarity in the 
prototypes extracted from the faces in their shared 
environment (Bronstad & Russell, 2007). That is, an 
individual’s perceptual experience shapes her facial 
preferences and conceivably her strategy for processing 
information from faces (Barraclough & Perrett, 2011; 
Keysers & Perrett, 2004). On a (cognitively) higher level, 
this is achieved by adaptively tuning attention to stimulus 
information motivationally relevant for the perceiver. On a 
lower, perceptual level, previous exposure and experience 
modulates the ‘norm’ or ‘average’ face encoded in the 
individual’s face space. Within the face space framework – 
and thereby also the ecological approach to face perception 
– norm-based coding refers to the idea that face identities 
are thought to be coded in terms of their deviation from an 
average (norm) face (Leopold et al., 2011; Tsao & 
Livingstone, 2008). Extensive findings on face aftereffects 
(Rhodes et al., 2004; Short & Mondloch, 2010), in which 
exposure to a certain face category changes subsequent 
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perceptions of faces, support this proposition. Adaptation 
to mixed-race face morphs, for example, shifts the 
prototype for face race towards the adapted category (e.g. 
Webster & MacLeod, 2011). In terms of neural activations, 
this effect is thought to rely on pairs of neural populations, 
which are adaptively tuned to above-average and below-
average values along each dimension of face space (Rhodes 
et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, a key neural region for the processing 
of rewarding stimuli, the medial orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC), is active only for facial stimuli motivationally 
appropriate for the perceiver. For example, Kranz & Ishai 
(2006) found OFC activation only when gay men viewed 
faces of other men, but not of women. In line with this is 
the finding that gaze (i.e. where a person looks) is generally 
affected by motivation, such that stimulus information 
deemed motivationally relevant is attended to more 
(Isaacowitz et al., 2011). Interestingly, the mOFC is known 
not only as the center for processing rewarding stimuli, but 
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has also been shown to be involved extensively in intuitive 
processing, as outlined above.  
Based on the evidence and the theoretical 
framework outlined above, I wanted to test whether: 
1. a difference in participant sexual orientation 
would also map onto differences in cognitive 
style, such that heterosexual individuals use 
intuitive processing and queer individuals use 
deliberative processing to judge the sexual 
orientation of others. 
2. these differences in cognitive style could be 
revealed via eye-tracking (replicating the 
findings of the study introduced in section 3.1). 
3. analogously to the Stern et al. study, queer 
individuals would rely less on gender-inversion 
cues for judgments of sexual orientation than 
heterosexual individuals would. 
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To this end, I asked participants to indicate their gender 
identity and sexual attraction on multiple scales. I thereby 
attempted to allow options of identification which go 
beyond the male/female binary used as standard on most 
psychological tests and are more similar to the variations of 
sex/gender found in brain structure and function (Joel & 
Fausto-sterling, 2016)13.  
Participants were shown computer-generated faces 
within two categories, separable by cues which are 
stereotypically assigned the labels ‘masculine’ or 
‘feminine’ in Western-European contexts. These were the 
categories “lips & lashes” (faces showing what could be 
considered as lipstick and painted eyelashes), and “beard & 
brows”, which featured a combination of bushy eyebrows 
and/or noticeable facial hair (beard, stubble, or mustache). 
Faces in both categories were morphed in four steps along 
                                                 
13 See Ch. IV.3 for classification of individuals as ‘queer’ or 
‘heterosexual’, based on their self-identification. 
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a continuum of ‘very female’ to ‘very male’ (categories pre-
defined by the software), resulting in 192 different stimuli. 
In two separate task blocks participants were asked to judge 
the gender identity of the displayed face (task 1), or what 
gender they perceived the displayed face to be sexually 
attracted to (task 2). Binocular eye movements were 
recorded concurringly.  
I did not find significant reaction time differences 
between the two groups, which might be due to the research 
design (see CH. IV.3 for discussion of this limitation), or 
because both groups use similar cognitive process types for 
their judgments. The other dependent variables (confidence 
in judgments, eye tracking data and phenomenological self-
report) point towards the former interpretation. Queer 
individuals were significantly less confident in their 
judgments and generally focused more on the eye region 
than heterosexual individuals. The global/holistic viewing 
pattern of heterosexual individuals (Figure 4 & 5, see Ch. 
IV.3, p. 112) is consistent with an intuitive processing 
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strategy for face judgments. Moreover, queer individuals 
relied less on gender-inversion cues for sexual orientation 
judgments and generally allowed for greater variations in 
judgment. Thus, participants’ eye movements and face 
judgments differed by strategy, with queer participants 
relying more on an analytic strategy of eye movement and 
less on gender-inversion cues, whereas heterosexual 
participants showed more of a global/holistic viewing 
pattern. Although the differences in fixation duration and 
number did not reach statistical significance after 
correcting for multiple comparisons, a clear trend in 
viewing pattern can nevertheless be discerned. I am 
currently in the planning stages of a follow-up study with 
larger sample size, in order to test the reproducibility of 
these findings. The conclusions as to differences in 
participant sexual orientation mapping onto differences in 
cognitive style are therefore tentative. However, the 
convergence of data trends in judgment frequencies, 
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confidence judgments, self-report and eye movement data 
do point towards a possible difference in judgment process.  
Although only tentative, this is among the first 
batch of evidence for a difference in both eye movement 
and judgment strategy based on an individual’s sexual 
orientation mapping onto a difference in cognitive strategy. 
Furthermore, it is evidence for the contribution of an 
individual’s experience to the reliance on an intuitive 
perceptual process to judge the sexual orientation of others 
(as found for heterosexual individuals), or the reliance on a 
more analytic strategy (as seen in queer individuals).  
A person’s sexual orientation is surely not the only 
factor shaping her perceptual exposure and experiences. 
When it comes to judging the gender identity and sexual 
orientation of others, however, one’s own sexual 
orientation is surely a highly motivationally relevant factor, 
not only in the limited time frame of a laboratory 
experiment, but especially during a person’s lifetime. The 
thereby moderated differences in attending to and 
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perceiving gender identities and sexual orientation over 
time thus translate into differences in exposure to and 
experience with gender identities and sexuality. In a 
heteronormative society, however, this experience does not 
seem to be ‘different enough’14 for queer individuals to trust 
an intuitive perceptual strategy when it comes to judging 
another person’s sexual orientation. Perhaps because of 
their own experiences in being misjudged, queer 
individuals rely on an analytical strategy when it comes to 
sexual orientation judgments. This is in line with findings 
by Tshkay et al. (2013), wherein participants’ sexual 
identity affected their response bias. Specifically, lesbian 
and bisexual participants were less likely to label female 
faces systematically as heterosexual. The authors interpret 
this as resulting from a higher familiarity with and exposure 
                                                 
14 Seeing as queer individuals are a minority group and therefore the 
exposure to individuals of this minority necessarily is small. 
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to sexual minorities in lesbian and bisexual than 
heterosexual woman. Speculation aside, the results of the 
present study point towards a link between individual 
differences in cognitive strategy and a perceiver’s sexual 
orientation. 
Contemporary concepts of intuitive judgment 
processes complement the adaptive view of social vision by 
emphasizing the importance of an individual’s life 
experience for the shaping of the intuitive judgment 
process. Furthermore, duality models explain dissociations 
between automatic versus controlled processes of judgment 
formation as originating from separate mental systems 
(Seymour Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Sloman, 1996; Fritz Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004) or separate mental representations or 
processes  (Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014), and 
responding differentially to the same situational input. 
I have shown that whether perceivers rely on an 
intuitive strategy for the judgment of faces depends not only 
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on the task15, but also on individual attributes of the 
perceiver. The present work provides evidence that the 
reliance on intuitive processes (i.e. rapid, automatic/non-
conscious and holistic information integration) for the 
judgment of a person’s sexual orientation depends, in part, 
on the sexual orientation of the perceiver themselves. 
Analytic decision-making lends itself for tasks that can be 
approached sequentially (Hammond et al., 1987). Due to 
personal experience with a concept of sexuality beyond the 
heterosexual norm, queer individuals may thus be inclined 
to approach sexual orientation judgments sequentially, 
based on rational analysis and reflection, rather than relying 
on a first, intuitive impression. The present work thereby 
further supports the notion of intuition as a process mode or 
strategy, rather than a biased mental system. 
 
                                                 
15 Sexual orientation does not affect intuitive judgment of gender 
identity, but does affect sexual identity judgments. 
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3.4 What types of feelings are gut feelings? 
The discussion on the different feeling types is outlined in 
the outlook below. For the full paper, see Ch. IV.4 of this 
thesis. 
4.  Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the growing body 
of knowledge on intuitive judgment processes. The present 
work primarily helps to advance the endeavor of an 
empirically grounded theoretical framework. Additionally, 
it elucidates ways in which intuitive processes contribute to 
the formation of judgments in social interactions. 
Understanding intuitive processing of social information is 
the basis for understanding phenomena such as impression 
formation and person perception. Since the social judgment 
domain is as of yet underrepresented in the intuition 
literature, this thesis provides crucial insights into the 
workings of intuitive judgment processes in this context. 
Moreover, it illuminates the usefulness of face perception 
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tasks for research on quotidian intuitive judgments. This 
contribution is achieved by means of four separate 
investigations, which addressed the posed research 
questions (p. 11) and revealed the following conclusions: 
1) The ‘default-disruption view’ based on literature 
describing introspective errors provides evidence 
for the claim that the default-interventionist model 
cannot be taken as a general explanatory framework 
for intuitive judgment processes. Similarly, neural 
predictions of dual systems theory do not hold for 
the judgment of faces. This engagement with the 
ongoing theoretical interdisciplinary debate is a 
prerequisite when investigating a phenomenon as 
elusive as intuition. 
2) The process of intuitively perceiving and judging 
another person based on their face is holistic & 
gestalt-like, using global information integration 
strategies. Thus, the characterization of intuition as 
‘holistic’ holds true in the social judgment domain. 
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3) Intuition facilitates social interaction through fast 
and automatic processing. Whether individuals 
employ intuitive processes to judge the sexual 
orientation of another person, however, depends on 
individual attributes of the perceiver, such as the 
perceiver’s own sexual orientation. 
4) As often colloquially noted, ‘gut feelings’ play a 
role in the intuitive processes. Which types of 
feelings are thus referred to and at which processing 
stage these are involved in intuitive judgment 
remains a topic of debate. A first look seems to point 
towards the notion, that different feeling types may 
in fact be involved in intuitive processes. 
 
Within social interactions, vast amounts of information 
need to be integrated quickly & accurately. Basing 
judgment on intuitive processes may be the only feasible 
option to accomplish the herculean task of integrating the 
multiple facets of people perception within split seconds. 
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This thesis provides evidence that in social interactions, 
intuition is an effective tool for judgment and perception. It 
relies on holistic information integration and previously 
stored experience. Whether and how its power is being 
used, however, may be determined by personal (individual) 
as well as context-dependent, or task, factors. 
Understanding intuitive processing of social information is 
the basis for understanding phenomena such as impression 
formation and person perception. Developing a better grasp 
on these phenomena is of utter importance, especially in 
times were social cohesion and the celebration of plurality 
cannot be taken for granted. As mentioned previously, the 
idea of a duality of the mind wherein intuition is pitted 
against reason and the corporeal against the mental has a 
vast history. However, as we are continually discovering 
more of the dynamic entanglements between body, mind 
and life experience, moving away from the idea of an 
antagonistic duality and towards understanding the 
functional characteristics of intuitive processes may 
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provide a more fruitful way to an integrated understanding 
of the mind. While I do not join Dr. Faust in his fatalistic 
conclusion that ‘we cannot know anything’, I will 
acknowledge that many questions remain to be answered 
and others to be asked. The general efficacy of intuition, for 
one, will most likely remain a topic of ongoing debate. 
Nevertheless, this thesis offers a view on a great 
opportunity for the characterization of intuitive processes 
in an ecologically valid and motivationally relevant 
context.  
 
5. Outlook 
Most contemporary concepts of intuition include the notion 
of an emotional or ‘feeling’ component, often colloquially 
referred to as ‘gut feeling’. In fact, several investigations 
into the neural architecture of intuition have identified a 
role of the anterior insula, a region that is known to 
instantiate subjective feelings (Craig, 2009; Critchley, 
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2005; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 
2004). To unravel the tangle of feeling-types thought to 
play a role within intuition, I would like to approach this 
question from the intuition rather than the feeling side. 
Using two prominent lines of empirical inquiry into 
intuition as examples, and drawing on theories of emotion 
as well as embodied cognition, I therefore ask the following 
questions: 
• Do ‘gut feelings’ play a functional 
role in the intuition process? If so, 
when do they enter the process?  
• If we assume gut feelings to play a 
role for intuitive processes, what 
types of feelings are ‘gut feelings’?  
• Are they (always) embodied? If so, 
where in the body are they located?  
• Are these ‘gut feelings’ more like 
visceral sensations, meta-cognitive 
feelings, or emotional feelings? 
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While a definitive answer to these questions would surely 
merit a completely new dissertation itself, in Ch. IV. 3 I 
provide first evidence for the argument that the term ‘gut 
feelings’ is used to denote different types of feelings in two 
prominent contexts of intuition research. These contexts are 
the (1) the Iowa Gambling Task (which is widely cited 
within the JDM community as providing evidence for a role 
of gut feelings, therein termed ‘somatic markers’) and (2) 
semantic coherence judgments. I argue that the feelings 
under investigation in both of these widely cited tasks are 
in fact different types of feelings and therefore should not 
be used as evidence for a single type of feeling component 
in intuitive judgments or decisions. 
The history of investigating either bodily sensations 
or affective reactions within tasks requiring intuition is 
long. Nevertheless, when it comes to integrating this 
evidence into theoretical frameworks of intuitive processes, 
the notion of this feeling component seems to be 
conceptually muddled and used in ignorance of the 
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different feeling concepts existent within the psychology 
and philosophy of emotions.  To advance knowledge on the 
ways in which intuitive processes contribute to judgment 
and decision-making, it is fruitful to disentangle these 
different types of feelings at play in various intuition 
research endeavors – both conceptually as well as 
empirically.  
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Imagine sitting in a grand hall, listening to the 
keynote lecture of the conference you are attending. 
At some point your thoughts drift off. When you look 
around you, half of the audience is staring intently at 
their smartphones. You ask yourself: what is it about 
this talk that makes you unable to stay focused? Do 
you find any aspect enjoyable? How would you 
behave, if it were you standing at the podium? 
Answering questions such as these, you are engaging 
in a process known as introspection. 
Introspection describes the ability to explicitly 
characterize experience. It enables one to say: “I am 
thinking about what I am thinking about”. In other 
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words, introspection allows one to become meta-
aware, that is, to have awareness of what one believes 
to be experiencing. Although agreement exists as to 
the fact that we all have and make experiences and 
therefore subjective experience seems indisputable 
(Schooler & Schreiber, 2004; Winkielman & Schooler, 
2011), empirically gaining access to and knowledge of 
this subjective experience poses a great challenge. It 
requires us to put a subjective, internal experience 
into words, such as in the above-mentioned example. 
This raises the question, if the words we come up with 
are true descriptions of our experience, or 
confabulations. Specifically, the dissociation between 
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experiential consciousness (the contents of 
experience) and meta-consciousness (the belief about 
the contents of experience) makes us fallible in 
appraising our own experiences. In some cases, this 
fallibility has been demonstrated to manifest in 
translational dissociations, that is, the distortion of 
experience in an attempt to recount or characterize it; 
this was termed the “introspective error” (Schooler, 
2002). Even though -- or perhaps because -- the 
paradox of introspection has been studied extensively 
for a number of decades, it is almost paradoxical itself 
to find that the resulting implications for the ongoing 
debate about (dual-) process types in judgment and 
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decision-making (JDM) and specifically for the most 
widely accepted and experimentally investigated 
default-interventionist model (D-I-Model) of dual-
process theory, have not been considered thus far. In 
the present contribution we set out to fill this gap and 
point out the implications of the introspective error 
for the conceptualization of the D-I-Model. 
In the (neuro-) scientific community, dual-
process models of intuitive and deliberate JDM 
currently constitute the preferred theoretical 
construct (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Glöckner & Witteman, 2010; 
Kahneman, 2011; Lieberman et al., 2002). These 
117 
 
 
models have been built on the assumption that 
judgments are formed via two qualitatively distinct 
process types: automatic “intuition” and controlled 
“deliberation” or “reflection”. In recent years, an 
immense influx of publications has arisen, either 
fervently defending or criticizing a dualistic 
distinction between rapid, autonomous, intuitive 
processes and slower, thoughtful, reasoning 
processes of higher order. In their most recent 
publication on dual-process models, Evans & 
Stanovich (2013) -- henceforth referred to as E&S -- 
described their concept as one, which assumes that 
automatic processes (Type 1, T1) yield default 
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responses unless an intervention by higher order 
reasoning processes (Type 2, T2) is needed; a model, 
which has been termed the D-I- Model. We will focus 
on this current-most description of dual-process 
theory, since it constitutes the predominant model 
being intensively discussed by leading authorities in 
the field16. E&S split the attributes of both process 
types into defining (necessary/sufficient) and 
correlated features. The defining features listed for T2 
processing are working memory capacity and 
                                                 
16 Compare the recent debate in the journal 
“Perspectives on Psychological Science”, Volume 8, 
2013. 
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cognitive decoupling. These are seen to be central in 
order to be able to reason hypothetically and 
distinguish supposition from belief, thereby aiding 
“rational choices by running thought experiments” 
(E&S, p. 236). Importantly, cognitive decoupling 
requires a re-representation of automatic (T1) 
processes so as to be able to interfere with their 
output. In that way T2 processing allows for 
“metarepresentational and simulation abilities”, and 
is thus a form of meta-consciousness. T1 processing, 
in contrast, is defined as encompassing both “innately 
specified processing modules or procedures and 
experiential associations that have been learned to the 
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point of automaticity” (E&S, p. 236). Explicitly 
opposing a general “good-bad thinking idea, the D-I-
Model assumes T1 processes to lead to correct 
answers in benign environments, i.e., whenever the 
decision maker can use overpracticed cues. However, 
as soon as conditions for successful T1 processing are 
not fulfilled (e.g., novel situations), T2 processing will 
have to intervene on the default intuition. E&S argue 
that due to peoples’ limited capacity of central 
cognitive resources, T1 processes inevitably will be 
relied on in most situations. The disposition to 
override the default intuition and to replace it by 
effective T2 reflective reasoning is suggested to be a 
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function of several factors; an important one being 
“measurable thinking dispositions that are inclined 
toward rational thinking and disinclined to accept 
intuitions without checking them out” (p. 237)17. In 
other words, cognitive decoupling allowing a re-
representation of automatic T1 processes seems to be 
decisive for intervention processes to become 
effective.  
Literature on the introspective error, however, 
poses a challenge for this dual-process view insofar as 
it has been shown that re-representing subjective 
                                                 
17 A feature of human intelligence, as E&S assert. 
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experience can lead to biases and incorrect decisions. 
Notably, this counterintuitive finding is not limited to 
T1-specific situations, where overlearned cues elicit 
the right answer, but also occurs in situations where 
the problem is hard to solve directly from previous 
experience or from previously stored cue validities. 
We will outline how the empirical results on 
introspection and meta-consciousness, presented by 
Schooler and others, are incongruent with the D-I-
type models’ assumption of reflective processes 
coming to the rescue of automatic response and will 
sketch a default-disruptive option. Therein, analytical 
introspection does not come to the rescue of intuitive, 
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holistic recognition but rather disrupts this process, 
leading to changes in preference and even creating 
false outcomes (e.g. erroneous memories). 
Verbal overshadowing: An exemplary case 
 The verbal-overshadowing effect, first described by 
Schooler and Engstler-Schooler in 1990, reveals a 
source of error in verbally describing a non-verbal 
stimulus: When individuals verbally introspect (i.e. 
attempt to describe in great detail) about complex 
non-verbal stimuli (e.g. recognizing a previously seen 
face, or the reasons for choice preferences), disruption 
can ensue. Particularly, individuals show markedly 
worse performance and make less optimal choices 
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when asked to verbally introspect. In the words of 
Schooler and Schreiber (2004): “Verbal introspection 
fails to adequately capture ineffable experience, 
breaking them apart in a manner that makes it 
difficult to put back together” (p.24). Interfering 
effects of verbalization have, for example, been found 
in a task requiring participants to watch a short video 
of a bank robbery and later attempt to identify the 
robber from a photo array. Those participants who 
had previously written a detailed description of the 
robber’s appearance were markedly worse on the 
identification task than the control group (Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990). The engagement of meta-
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conscious representation of subjective experience for 
subsequent production of a verbal description from 
memory actually led to a distortion of witness’ 
memory, producing false outcomes. Schooler and 
colleagues posit that dissociations and omissions such 
as these can occur even when participants simply 
think aloud -- concurrently or retrospectively -- to the 
ongoing experiment. The authors reason that these 
distortions are due to the fact that participants are 
forced to verbally re-represent inherently non-verbal 
experiences (Schooler et al., 1993; Lane & Schooler, 
2004; Winkielman & Schooler, 2011). This argument 
points to the introspective error mentioned above, 
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wherein meta-consciousness is seen to misrepresent 
or distort underlying experience. In other words, the 
reflective mind lacks awareness of its own subjective 
state. This, however, would on the other hand be 
required in order to monitor when an intervention is 
necessary, according for instance to the D-I-Model.  
 The verbal overshadowing effect is not limited 
to visual introspection. Similar evidence comes from 
studies on preferential choice. Wilson and Schooler 
(1991) compared college students’ preferences for 
courses with the ratings of experts. Students who 
were asked to introspect, i.e. analyzed the reasons 
why they preferred some courses over others, or 
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evaluated attributes of all courses, made choices that 
corresponded less with experts’ opinions than the 
choices of control subjects.  
 
The two main points in discord with D-I-type models 
of dual-processes that are raised by the verbal 
overshadowing effect are as follows: 
1. Verbal description of non-verbal memories induces 
distorting reflective processes (Jack & Roepstorff, 2002).  
According to D-I-type models, T2 reflective processes are called 
upon to intervene on default answers in situations beyond those 
relying on innate or conditioned response capacities .Here, the 
engagement of T2 processing is assumed to be more likely to find 
the (normatively) correct answer. However, evidence from the 
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study of introspection shows that performance may be less 
accurate when reflective strategies are applied (Dunning & 
Stern, 1994). Thereby, intervention by reflection disrupts 
performance (e.g., face recognition performance) rather than 
enhancing it. 
2. “Analytic introspective processes induced by 
describing memories can disrupt holistic non-verbal 
recognition processes” (Schooler & Schreiber, 2004, p. 
25)]. 
In the above-mentioned example of the eyewitnesses, 
as we understand it, the D-I-Model would predict the 
default rise of a gut reaction (T1) to identify the 
perpetrator. When overridden by careful reflection 
(T2), the correct person should be remembered. 
Instead, as mentioned above, the opposite is true. 
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Importantly, this misrepresentation of underlying 
experience is not explained by a monitoring failure. 
The monitoring failure account describes the 
introduction of bias, not from a lack of appropriate 
knowledge or cognitive resources (“mindware”) but 
a failure to call on this knowledge when it would be 
needed (De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). However, the 
distortion of underlying experience by recall and 
verbalization is qualitatively different from the failure 
to draw on the appropriate knowledge. In 
misrepresenting (subjective) experience, the 
knowledge of the occurrence of experience needs to 
be actively called upon by meta-consciousness but the 
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belief about what has been experienced does not align 
with what was actually experienced. Taken together, 
these findings lead us to propose an opposing view to 
the D-I-Model to describe subjective, non-
verbalizable experiences; this is the “default-
disruptive view”. 
 
The default-disruptive view 
We propose tasks requiring introspection about 
inherently non-verbalizable processes as examples in 
which a default-disruptive option might more closely 
represent a mapping of people’s cognitive processes 
as opposed to the current D-I-type models.  
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Tasks requiring the re-representation of inherently 
subjective conscious experience (what could be seen 
as being processed by the ‘autonomous mind’18) may 
elicit a translational dissociation between experiential 
consciousness and meta-consciousness (‘reflective 
mind’). The recruitment of T2 processes disrupts the 
default response in non-verbalizable experiences, 
leading to: 
- Distortions of underlying experience (e.g., verbal 
overshadowing effect) 
- Decline in performance (e.g., speed) 
                                                 
18 In keeping with Stanovich’s “Tripartite Model of 
the Mind”.  
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- Decline in accuracy (e.g., recognition) 
The introspective error challenges D-I-type dual-
process models precisely because T1 processes are by 
their definition affect-laden decisions, based on a gut 
feeling primarily reflecting (non-verbalizable) 
experience (Betsch, 2008). Thus, overriding intuitive 
responses and replacing them by T2, reflective 
reasoning stringently requires a re-representation of 
subjective experience – raising the issues addressed 
above.   
The challenge of the introspective error is all the 
more important since we are constantly encouraged, 
by self-help books and the like, for example, to 
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carefully re-think (important) decisions in order to 
make the right choice.  For instance, we can vividly 
imagine a police officer encouraging an eyewitness to 
carefully reconsider her response, emphasizing the 
implication a false statement would have; ironically, 
in doing so the police officer will foster exactly this 
outcome. Thus, dealing with the implications of 
research on the introspective error is not only relevant 
for the conceptualization of D-I-type dual-process 
models, but additionally has considerable 
implications for real-life decision making.  
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In summation, the ‘default-disruptive’ view is a 
preliminary approximation to an alternate account of 
dual-process models in situations requiring 
introspection on internal processes. However, E&S 
themselves state that they “view the development of 
dual-process theories as an evolving project. Just as 
[dual-process theories] have developed and changed 
a great deal in the past decade, we expect this process 
to continue” (p.237). In this vein, our work provides a 
starting point and a fresh view for this evolutionary 
process.  
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Nonverbal signals such as facial expressions are 
of paramount importance for social encounters. 
Their perception predominantly occurs without 
conscious awareness and is effortlessly integrated 
into social interactions. In other words, face 
perception is intuitive. Contrary to classical 
intuition task, this work investigates intuitive 
processes in the realm of every-day type social 
judgments. Two differently instructed groups of 
participants judged the authenticity of emotional 
facial expressions, while their eye movements 
were recorded. Pixel-wise statistical maps of the 
resulting eye movements revealed a differential 
viewing pattern, wherein the intuitive pattern 
closely resembles a global holistic viewing 
strategy. Interestingly, this difference in cognitive 
strategy was found even though participants of 
both groups were Caucasians of a young age. A 
holistic viewing pattern for faces has previously 
been shown only in East-Asian individuals. The 
142 
 
 
holistic pattern of intuitive face judgments is in 
line with evidence showing that intuition is related 
to processing the “gestalt” of an object, rather than 
focusing on details. Our work thereby provides 
further evidence that intuitive processes are 
characterised by holistic perception, in an 
understudied and real world domain of intuition 
research.  
Keywords: intuition; eye-tracking; holistic 
processing; judgment; face perception; dual-
process theory 
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What is Intuition? 
Evaluation of other persons, important as it is to our 
existence, is largely automatic, one of the things we 
do without knowing very much about the 
“principles” in terms of which we operate.  (Renato 
Tagiuri (1958) , p. ix) 
The intuitiveness of rapid perceptions made during social 
encounters and often leading to the judgment and 
interpretation of race, gender, ethnicity and emotional state 
of other persons has been reliably demonstrated. In other 
words: "Intuition is essential to optimal social and 
interpersonal functioning" (Ambady, 2010). Understanding 
this intuitive processing of (social) information is of utter 
importance for general society and policy makers alike. It 
lies at the basis of understanding social interactions in 
general as well as specific phenomena such as impression 
formation, person perception and adaptive social 
behaviour. Despite the fact that many of our human 
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experiences rely on intuition -especially social interactions, 
as referred to above -- a clear scientific definition of 
intuition remains elusive. Intuition has often been 
theoretically described through the demarcation by a 
second “type of thinking” (Jonathan St B T Evans, 2008; 
Witteman, Van Bercken, Claes, & Godoy, 2009), namely 
slow and effortful deliberation. This dualistic distinction is 
ancient in origin and can be found widely in both 
psychological as well as philosophical writing, dating as far 
back as Plato (Evans & Frankish, 2009, p.2). Among the 
most widely purported explanans of such social judgment 
behavior are dual-process theories (DPT). The details of the 
various theories differ from each other, depending mostly 
on the domain in which they are being investigated (e.g., 
Lieberman et al., 2002; Strack and Deutsch, 2004; 
Glöckner and Witteman, 2010; Kahneman, 2011; Evans 
and Stanovich, 2013). Common to DPT models is the 
assumption that our mind is governed by two qualitatively 
distinct systems- or process types: automatic “intuition” 
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(Type 1) and controlled, effortful “deliberation” (Type 2). 
These theories propose that T1 and T2 may either compete 
or cooperate in order to produce observed behaviour (J. S. 
B. T. Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Strack & Deutsch, 2015).  
Despite the prevalence of DPT, both the 
psychological and philosophical community have been 
entrenched in critical debates about the characteristics and 
the interplay between the supposedly two distinct process 
types, with different alternative accounts and empirical data 
suggesting a closer similarity between the two process 
types than previously assumed (Kruglanski, 2013; 
Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Mega, Gigerenzer, & 
Volz, 2015a; Osman, 2013). The sheer amount of these 
proposed theories have thus not made the search for a 
definition of intuition an easy one. Rather than searching 
for the truth value of intuition (i.e. “what intuition really 
is”), specifically investigating the different underlying 
processes (Glöckner&Witteman, 2010) as well as the 
characteristics of its operation (Ferguson, Mann & 
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Wojnowicz, 2014) has been suggested as a more fruitful 
endeavour.  Existing functional characterizations of 
intuitive processes differ somewhat from each other; 
arguably, because the domains in which intuition operates 
are various and thus its characteristics tend to vary. Some 
converging characteristics have emerged over the years, 
however (Gerd Gigerenzer, 2007; Hogarth, 2001; Plessner, 
H., Betsch, T., Betsch, 2008): 
• Intuition relies on a (tacit) knowledge base which is 
acquired throughout one's lifetime. 
• It elicits the colloquially known "gut feeling". That 
is, intuitive judgment relies on some type of 
metacognitive experience, such as a feeling of 
rightness or processing fluency (Proust, 2015; 
Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012), which lead the 
decision maker to her judgment or choice.  
• The reasons for her judgment remain elusive to the 
decision-maker. That is to say that intuition operates 
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without the decision maker being conscious of the 
internal processes that are leading her (judgment) 
behaviour.  
 
Consequently, the present work aims to characterize the 
cognitive processes involved in intuitive social judgments, 
by investigating eye movement patterns in a face judgment 
task. 
 
To date, a large part of research performed to probe 
intuition has heavily relied on tasks requiring a proficient 
basis in statistics and sometimes even probability theory. 
Tasks such as Kahneman and Tversky’s classical base-rate 
neglect problems (Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A., 1973), 
but also the often utilized problem solving tasks require 
logical and probabilistic reasoning to arrive at what is 
considered the normatively ‘correct’ answer. While 
seemingly pointing out instances in which intuition leads us 
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astray, what is problematic in many of these tasks is the fact 
that the laboratory setting individuals are in when solving 
the tasks create a social setting in which cooperation with 
the person administrating the study as well as their 
instructions is the socially preferable behaviour.  This 
approach has been criticized variously, not least of all 
because of the large gap between the experimental tasks and 
decision problems faced in everyday life (e.g. Eiser, 2012; 
Gigerenzer, 2000). 19 A growing body of studies suggests 
that perhaps only neurological and mental abnormalities 
foster conformity to norms of rationality (Hertwig & Volz, 
2013). The approach also seems problematic insofar as 
social psychology has shown that intuition plays a major 
                                                 
19 In fact, proponents of the adaptive rationality hypothesis (G. 
Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2013) point 
out that the normative criteria of logic or rational decision theory are 
too narrow and abstract and instead behavior should be measured 
against the goals individuals entertain in a particular situation. 
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role in social encounters. With respect to nonverbal 
behaviour (i.e. communicative signals sent through 
channels of face, voice, posture etc.) current literature 
suggests that evaluative judgments thereof occur 
automatically, outside awareness and without drawing on 
conscious cognitive processing resources (Ambady & 
Weisbuch, 2010). These characteristics are hallmarks of 
intuitive processing. Pioneers of social judgment research 
have argued that the study of motivationally relevant 
stimuli (‘social’ stimuli, in a wider sense) is clearly distinct 
from the judgment of motivationally neutral stimuli (Sherif 
& Hovland, 1961). As opposed to traditional decision-
making tasks, the objects to be judged in social judgment 
research have meaning and value derived from social 
relationships and interactions (Eiser, 2012). It is for this 
reason that the present work relies on a social judgment 
task, namely the judgment of facial expressions.  
To investigate the cognitive processes involved in 
the intuitive judgment of faces, we utilized the 
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measurement of eye movements -- a methodology known 
to "provide an objective insight into the information 
entering the visual system and into cognitive processes 
involved" (Armann & Bülthoff, 2009). Intuitive processing 
is often related to processing the “gestalt” of an object 
rather than focusing on details. In this vein, several recent 
studies have suggested that people may in some cases use a 
global or holistic strategy to process the information present 
in faces rather than relying on detailed features (e.g. Chuk 
et al., 2014). By global/holistic processing we refer to 
processing the gestalt of an object rather than its featural 
details, such as focusing on the eyes, nose and the mouth. 
Since the term ‘holistic processing’ has been used to 
describe different phenomena, we choose ‘global/holistic 
processing’ to denote the broader sense of a global 
impression, as used, for example, in visual cognition (see 
Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002 & McKone, 
Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007 for a discussion of 
terminology).  
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A global processing style has been related to 
intuition on several different occasions. Dijkstra and 
colleagues, for example, have demonstrated that the effects 
of decision mode (intuitive versus deliberate) on judgement 
are mediated by processing style (K. A. Dijkstra, van der 
Pligt, van Kleef, & Kerstholt, 2012; K. a Dijkstra, van der 
Pligt, & van Kleef, 2013). Their results suggest that similar 
mechanisms underlie intuition and global processing. 
Moreover, trait inferences from faces are considered to be 
intuitive, relying on less than 100ms exposure for 
impression formation (e.g. Willis & Todorov, 2006) 
However, to our knowledge the question whether 
relying on one’s intuition to judge facial expressions maps 
onto a global/holistic viewing strategy has not been directly 
probed. We therefore set out to study the eye movement 
patterns of two differently instructed groups of participants:  
152 
 
 
• An “intuitive group”, whom we instructed to judge 
the authenticity of facial expressions relying on 
their “gut feeling” and “answering spontaneously 
• A “deliberate group”, whom we instructed to judge 
the authenticity of (the same) facial expressions 
after careful thought and focusing especially on the 
eye and mouth region (see Methods for explicit 
instructions).20 
The present work relies on a design that has been 
successfully used to investigate intuitive processing using 
                                                 
20 A feature-based face processing strategy has reliably 
been shown for individuals of the age range and ethnicity 
of our participants. By asking participants to focus on the 
eye- and mouth region, we therefore simply explicitly 
instructed them to focus on the features we expected that 
these types of individuals are known to focus on. The 
deliberate group is therefore a kind of control condition. 
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fMRI methodology (Mega, Gigerenzer, & Volz, 2015). 
Furthermore, the direct instruction of decision mode in a 
between-subject design follows the methodological 
recommendations of leading experts in the field 
(Horstmann, Hausmann, & Ryf, 2009). We presented 171 
happy and fearful faces (342 total stimuli of various ages 
and genders) and asked participants to judge how authentic 
they perceived the facial expression to be. We hypothesized 
that, if intuitive judgments of faces rely on a global/holistic 
processing style, the intuitive condition should elicit fewer 
fixations in total and the attention map of the intuitive group 
should conform to a global/holistic pattern of perception. 
That is, the fixation pattern should be more 
narrow/condensed and cluster around the centre of the 
stimulus (face), rather than conforming to a featural 
processing strategy, i.e. fixating predominantly the eyes 
and the mouth region. Conversely, we would expect the 
intuitive group to show the same pattern as the deliberate 
one (this being the classical pattern of face processing 
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found in Caucasian individuals), if the intuitive processing 
of facial expressions does not rely on holistic perception 
mode. 
A number of tasks have revealed two distinct 
viewing strategies between participants, despite the fact 
that all participants were instructed equally. In a judgment 
task of two concurrently presented faces, Armann and 
Bülthoff found that two sub-groups emerged in the 
judgment of femininity. While one sub-group of 
participants preferentially fixated the eye region, the second 
group fixated the centre of the face (here, the AOI of the 
nose) more and longer. Together with the verbal reports of 
the participants, they interpreted the group showing longer 
and more centralized fixations as a separate, more holistic 
strategy (Armann & Bülthoff, 2009). Interestingly, the 
participants themselves reported performing the task 
“intuitively” trying to gain an “overall impression”. Using 
a face recognition task in Asian participants, Chuck and 
colleagues modelled participants’ eye movement patterns 
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using Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). By clustering the 
HMMs, participants’ eye movements could be classified 
into either a holistic or analytic patterns. Interestingly, this 
study showed that the strategy difference lies not only in 
the location of the fixations, but also in the transitions 
between fixations (Chuk, Chan, & Hsiao, 2014). Here, a 
more condensed fixation pattern on the centre of the face 
was interpreted as ‘holistic pattern’ (as opposed to an 
analytical pattern, consisting of fixation areas on both eyes 
and the mouth). 
We set out to further characterize intuition by 
directly investigating intuitive processing in a 
motivationally salient task known to engage intuition in 
everyday life. We studied the eye movements of two 
differentially instructed groups of participants, while these 
were engaged in the judgment of facial expressions. Based 
on previous research providing indications that intuition 
might be related to a global/holistic processing style, and 
that fixation strategies in face perception sometimes (but 
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not always) rely on global rather than local information, we 
expected to find evidence for global processing in the 
intuitive, but not in the deliberate condition. 
 
 
Methods 
Participants and Instruction 
Forty-three healthy, right-handed volunteers were included 
in this study (32 females; mean age: 25.87; 7 undisclosed 
gender & age) and compensated monetarily for their 
participation. Handedness was tested using the Edinburgh 
Handedness Survey. Eighteen participants were excluded 
from analysis, either due to technical difficulties during 
scanning or because post session questioning revealed a 
non-adherence to instruction, resulting in twenty-five 
participants in total (13 in the intuitive, 12 in the deliberate 
group). Informed consent was obtained from each 
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participant prior to the experiment according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki (Version 2013). The local ethics 
committee of the University of Tuebingen approved the 
experimental standards. Data was handled anonymously. 
All participants were native German speakers, had no 
history of neuropsychiatric disorders, and were not 
currently taking psychoactive medications. Participants 
were pseudo-randomly assigned to two conditions: In the 
intuitive group, participants received the following 
instruction:  
“Your task is to judge the emotional expression you 
will see with regard to its authenticity 
(realness)...Previous studies have shown that people 
are good at judging the authenticity (realness) of a 
smiling or fearful expression if they follow their 
initial feeling, that is, answer spontaneously and 
without thinking for too long. We therefore ask you 
to make your judgment quickly, and most 
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importantly, to follow your first feeling, thus 
deciding ‘based on your gut.’”  
The term “intuition” was intentionally not used in the 
instruction in order to avoid bias effects. In contrast, the 
instruction for the deliberate group was as follows: 
 “Your task is to judge the emotional expression you 
will see regarding its authenticity 
(realness)...Previous studies have shown that people 
are good at judging the authenticity (realness) of a 
smiling or fearful expression if they analyse and 
study the expression well, that is, think about their 
answer. Therefore, before you respond, study the 
expression thoroughly—within the given time! 
Most importantly, pay attention to the matching of 
the facial muscles in the eye and mouth regions.”  
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This instruction of strategy relies on a design that has been 
successfully used to investigate intuitive processing using 
fMRI methodology (Mega, Gigerenzer, & Volz, 2015) and 
is proposed as standard in the field (Horstmann, Hausmann, 
et al., 2009). Similar wording has also been used in other 
tasks probing face judgments (Rule, Ambady, & Hallett, 
2009). 
Stimuli 
In the experimental session, participants were presented 
with 340 stimuli, showing either a happy or a fearful facial 
expression, while their eye movements were recorded. 
Stimuli were taken from the FACE database established by 
Ebner, Riediger, and Lindenberger (2010) and presented at 
600 x 750 pixels image size on black background. 
Participants viewed the stimuli from 51cm distance, on a 
monitor with a screen resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels. 
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Apparatus 
Eye movements were recorded at a sampling rate of 220Hz 
with the Arrington ViewPoint Eyetracker, using a chin and 
forehead rest. Only the dominant eye was tracked 
(monocular tracking). The experiment was implemented in 
Matlab (2012b The MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA), using 
the Psychophysics Toolbox (PTB-3). Calibrations of eye 
fixations were conducted at the beginning of the experiment 
using a nine-point fixation procedure using ViewPoint 
software. Calibrations were then validated with the 
ViewPoint software and repeated when necessary until the 
optimal calibration criterion was reached. 
Task Outline 
The experiment consisted of 340 stimuli, showing either a 
happy or a fearful facial expression. Participants were 
tasked with indicating whether they perceived the facial 
expression to be authentic or not (yes/no response 
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assignment was balanced across participants). 170 happy 
and 170 fearful facial expressions were presented, wherein 
gender and age group of the lay actors in the stimulus 
pictures (“young” [M=24.2 years, SD=3.4; range 19-31], 
“middle-aged” [M= 49.0 years, SD=3.9; range 39-55], and 
“57 years and older” [M=73.2 years, SD=2.8; range 69-80] 
as classified by Ebner, 2010) were balanced across 
conditions. Happy and fearful facial expressions were 
presented in blocks of ten, resulting in 34 blocks across the 
entire experiment. All trials lasted for 6 s: after a short 
fixation (variable duration), the neutral facial expression of 
the respective lay actor was shown for 1s, followed by the 
presentation of the emotional facial expression, which was 
either shown for a maximum of 2s, or for as long as 
participants took to make their choice (response-dependent 
abortion). For the remaining time of the trial, a fixation 
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cross was presented. Finally, participants were debriefed 
and thanked. 
Figure 1 
 
Data Processing and Analysis 
Raw eye tracking data was processed by automatically 
detecting blinks, as well as dropped frames, and removing 
the resulting artefacts. A running average was used to 
interpolate data between the start and end points of the blink 
artefacts. Fixation events were classified using the I-DT 
algorithm as introduced by Salvucci and Goldberg (2000) 
with the modifications proposed by Blignaut (2009). Based 
on recommendations in the literature, the thresholds applied 
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were 100ms (min. time) and 0,8° visual angle (dispersion). 
Dependent variables were number of fixations and fixation 
duration (throughout the stimulus space), as well as the 
data-driven, statistically established attention map (i.e. 
viewing pattern) of both groups separately and in 
comparison. Global eye-tracking measures (number of 
fixations and fixation duration) were calculated using IBM 
SPSS Version 22 (IBM Corporation and others, 2013). The 
statistical fixation maps were computed with the iMap 
toolbox (version 3, Caldara and Miellet, 2011), running on 
Matlab 2014b (The MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). iMap 
establishes significance using a robust statistical approach 
correcting for multiple comparisons in the fixation map 
space. A one-tailed Pixel test (Chauvin et al.,2005) was 
applied for the group fixation maps (p< 1,0) and a two-
tailed Pixel test ( p<0.05) on the differential fixation maps. 
Finally, for each condition average Z-score values were 
extracted for each observer individually, within the regions 
showing significance in the differential fixation maps.  
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Manipulation Check 
To assure that participants in the two groups 
did rely on the instructed strategy 
(intuitive/deliberate), we compared the response 
latencies for the two conditions. Indeed, participants 
in the intuitive group (M = 1.156 s) were significantly 
faster in judging the authenticity of facial expressions 
than participants in the deliberate condition (M = 
1.528 s). 
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Results 
Global Eye-Tracking Measures 
Number of Fixations 
A repeated measures ANOVA testing the number of 
fixations on the entire stimulus (including only those pixels 
wherein at least 8 fixation events occurred) revealed a 
significant difference between the intuitive and the 
deliberate group: F (1,21) = 5.520, p = 0.028 (α = 0.05). The 
mean number of fixations per group on the stimulus was 
5.135 (deliberate) and 3.596 (intuitive). Thus, overall, the 
intuitive group showed fewer fixations on the face stimuli 
than the deliberate group. 
 
Fixation Duration 
The analysis of fixation durations between the two groups 
revealed a tendency for longer fixations in the intuitive 
conditions, albeit this difference did not reach statistical 
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significance: F (1,21) = 3.553, p = 0.073 (α = 0.05). The 
mean fixation duration per group on the stimulus was 
0.183s (deliberate) and 0.211s (intuitive). Neither the test 
for the effect of expression (i.e. happy or fearful), nor the 
interaction effect between expression and group revealed 
any significant differences in the fixation count or duration. 
 
Pixel-wise statistical Analysis (iMap3) 
We used the power of iMap3 as statistical mapping method 
for fixation data to represent and compare the distribution 
of the number and of the duration of the fixations on the 
face stimuli. We collapsed the fixation data from all face 
stimuli into one category, to compare and contrast overall 
viewing patterns, resulting in two fixation maps (fixation 
duration and number of fixations) for each individual. We 
then grouped the individual fixation maps by instruction to 
compute Z-scores on a pixel-by-pixel basis, resulting in Z-
score statistical maps (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) allowing for direct 
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comparison of the two conditions. This data-driven method 
allows for direct comparisons of the differential viewing 
patterns (also referred to as attention map) between the two 
instruction groups, thus enabling us to go beyond the AOI 
approach.  
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
Attention Map 
For the intuitive group, the viewing pattern as revealed by 
the iMap analysis is narrow and centralized in the stimulus 
space (Fig. 2 a & b).  In contrast, the attention map of the 
deliberate group shows a much wider spread of attention 
over the entire stimulus space, with several areas of 
significant attention clustered in a dispersed pattern around 
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the face (Figure 3).  
Since fixation durations have been shown to be 
highly idiosyncratic and judgment strategy itself already is 
a highly individualized marker, we focus here on the more 
robust number of fixations to compare the two judgment 
conditions. The viewing patterns as revealed by fixation 
duration are analogous, however. 
 
Additional Measures 
For each condition we extracted the average descriptive 
values (i.e. number of fixation [Figure 4] and fixation 
duration [Figure 5]) for each observer individually, within 
the regions showing significance in the differential fixation 
maps.  
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Figure 4 
Figure 5 
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Discussion 
We set out to further characterize intuition by directly 
investigating intuitive processing in a motivationally salient 
task. Intuitive processing is often related to processing the 
“gestalt” of an object rather than focusing on details (e.g. 
Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Shapiro & Spence, 1997).  While a 
local processing style is related to a focus on details and 
concrete features, when in a global processing style, people 
make sense of a stimulus by integrating it into superordinate 
knowledge structures (K. a Dijkstra et al., 2013). 
In this vein, several recent studies have suggested 
that people may in some cases use a global/holistic strategy 
to process the information present in faces rather than 
relying on detailed features. To our knowledge the question 
whether using one’s intuition to judge facial expressions 
maps onto a global viewing strategy has not been directly 
probed. To this end, we set out to study the eye movement 
patterns of two differently instructed groups of participants:  
172 
 
 
• An “intuitive group”, whom we instructed to judge 
the authenticity of facial expressions by relying on 
their “gut feeling” and “answering spontaneously”. 
• A “deliberative group”, whom we instructed to 
judge the authenticity of (the same) facial 
expressions after careful thought and focusing 
especially on the eye and mouth region. 
The viewing pattern of the intuitive group is distinct from 
the deliberate one, confirming the elicitation of a difference 
in strategy by direct instruction (see (see Horstmann et al., 
2009 for recommendations on using direct instructions 
when investigating intuition). In addition to confirming our 
manipulation, the fixation pattern conforms to theory-based 
expectations, which suggest the use of a global information 
search strategy in intuitive processing. The following 
arguments shall clarify this conclusion in detail. 
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Centralized attention map in intuitive condition 
The attention map revealed by the data-driven iMap 
analysis provides validation for the finding of 
global/holistic processing in the intuitive condition. The 
attention map of the intuitive group is centralized within the 
face-stimulus space, with the highest number of fixations 
(i.e. the area of greatest attention) localized around the area 
of the face midline (between the eyebrows, nose and 
mouth). The deliberate condition, on the other hand, 
conforms to the instructed viewing strategy, landing on 
both the eyes and the mouth region and generally more 
spread out across the stimulus-space. This pattern 
constitutes the average pattern of face perception, reliably 
found for young Caucasian individuals viewing static face 
stimuli in eye-tracking studies (e.g. Saether et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, several face perception studies, which did not 
directly instruct differential viewing modes, nevertheless 
found separable viewing patterns interpreted to be 
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differential viewing strategies (cp. Armann & Bülthoff, 
2009; Chuk, Chan, & Hsiao, 2014).  
 
Reliability of data by the use of data-driven 
approach with iMap3.  
Areas (or regions) of interest in eye tracking studies are 
often defined manually by the investigator and thereby 
what is termed as the “nose” in one study might well 
correspond to the area defined as “left eye” in another.  For 
example, Barton et al. (2006) defined the mouth region as 
irregularly shaped region of interest around the mouth, 
whereas (2005) included part of the cheek in their definition 
of the “mouth” region of interest. Thus, eye movements of 
participants to the cheek would be defined as landing on the 
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“mouth” in one study, but not in the other21. To avoid this 
confusion and lack of generalizability, we used a data-
driven approach based on pixel-wise statistical 
comparisons with multiple comparison correction (iMap, 
Version 3, Caldara & Miellet, 2011). This approach allows 
for robust direct comparisons of the differential scanning 
patterns between conditions. The imap3 analysis revealed 
areas of significant difference between the two conditions 
in the amount of fixations, located in the centre of the 
stimulus space. In other words, the centre of the face was 
fixated significantly more often in the intuitive condition, 
than in the deliberate one. The distribution of fixations in 
the deliberate condition was more distinctly localized on 
the eye, nose and mouth region of the stimulus faces. Thus, 
                                                 
21 see the Eye Data Quality Standardization Project 
[http://www.cogain.org/info/eye-data-quality] of the COGAIN 
Network of Excellence for an attempt at unifying method-wide 
standards of measure 
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this condition shows less fixations landing on the centre on 
the face than the intuitive one. We take these findings as 
further evidence in support of the hypothesis that intuitively 
judging faces relies on global/holistic face processing.  
 
Significantly fewer, but relatively longer fixations in the 
intuitive condition 
The finding of fewer fixations for the intuitive as opposed 
to the deliberate condition is in line with previous findings 
investigating intuitive and deliberate judgment processes 
using eye-tracking, albeit in a lexical task (Horstmann, 
Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009). However, it is imperative to 
not interpret the number of fixations and fixation duration 
should not be interpreted in isolation of the fixation 
locations (viewing pattern). The (average) three fixations of 
the intuitive group could have also landed only on the eye 
region (cp. Armann & Bülthoff, 2009), or the eyes and 
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mouth. If it was simply the difference in judgment speed 
that underlies the viewing differences between the two 
groups, that pattern would be expected. Instead, the few 
fixations required for the intuitive group to make their 
judgments fell in a centralized location of the stimulus 
faces, in accordance with our theoretical predictions. 
Intuitive face judgments seem to rely on “focusing on the 
forest rather than the trees”, or in this case, forming a 
holistic gestalt-like impression of the face rather than 
focusing on specific local featural cues (such as eyes, 
mouth or nose). Making few (but relatively long) fixations 
in a centralized location of the face can give a general 
impression of the facial expression. 
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Intuitive face judgment uses global viewing pattern 
When investigating face perception mechanisms of 
Western-Caucasians, as well as participants of a ‘young’ 
age group (i.e. around the mean age of the participants in 
this study, i.e. 25.87), the viewing pattern typically found is 
a feature-based one. That is, young Westerners usually 
seem to rely more on local information in the face (mostly 
the eye and mouth region) especially when compared with 
the viewing pattern of Asian participants (cp. Kelly, 
Miellet, & Caldara, 2010 and Sébastien Miellet, Vizioli, 
He, Zhou, & Caldara, 2013 for an overview of the effects 
of culture on eye movement strategies). Since the present 
study was conducted solely with participants of a Western-
Caucasian cultural background, one could expect a local, 
feature-based processing strategy (focusing on eye- and 
mouth region) for both instruction groups. Therefore, we 
take the differential markers for holistic/global processing 
revealed in the intuitive condition (fewer overall fixations, 
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centrally located in the face) to be a specific function of the 
instructed judgment condition. Seeing as global viewing 
strategies of faces have been demonstrated reliably as an 
East Asian viewing pattern, the present investigation raises 
the question whether East Asians might rely more on their 
intuition to view faces than people of a different cultural 
background. This question, however, is beyond the purview 
of the present study and will need to be investigated more 
in the future. 
Questions for further research:  
From research on eye movement patterns in reading, a quite 
well documented effect is the extrafoveal sampling of 
information in the stimulus. Recently, Millet and 
colleagues (2012; 2013) showed that the sampling of 
extrafoveal information also plays a role in face 
recognition. Therefore, finding a centralized fixation 
pattern may point towards the sampling of the other cues in 
the face extrafoveally. Since we did not directly investigate 
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this matter, we can only speculate on the involvement of 
extrafoveal sampling in the present study. We believe, 
however, that extracting extrafoveal information does not 
speak against intuitive processing being a distinguishable 
viewing pattern. Rather, sampling of information that is not 
directly fixated conforms to the characterization of 
intuition, describing it as a process whereby information is 
sampled but does not reach consciousness (Bowers, 
Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Horr, Braun, & Volz, 
2014; Mega et al., 2015b). Further investigations are 
needed to shed light on the role of extrafoveal information 
sampling for intuitive face judgments. 
Differential viewing strategies are also discussed as 
a function of task demands and individual differences. 
Within the community studying intuition, individual 
differences have long been recognized as an important 
factor. Since the characteristics demarcating intuition 
(automatic processes relying on a tacit knowledge base that 
reaches consciousness through some form of metacognitive 
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experience (e.g. fluency), thereby leading the decision-
maker to her judgment) are heavily based on internal 
representations, it is not surprising that individual 
difference effects should arise/play a role. Furthermore, 
Millet et al. argue for task-induced differences, a logic 
which we very much agree with (see Introduction). 
Since we believe the centralized location of the area 
of significant viewing difference between the two 
conditions to be a function of global processing, we do not 
make inferences as to the role of this specific facial region 
for the differences in face judgments. We would like to 
refrain from speculation about the role of the fixated 
regions, especially because no reliable community-standard 
of measurement and location yet exists for eye tracking 
studies (as opposed to fMRI studies, for example, which 
make use of anatomical atlases such as the Talairach Atlas 
[Talairach & Tournoux, 1988]). However, the gaze 
contingent expanding spotlight method has recently been 
introduced as a means to assess the visual processing of 
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peripheral versus central retinal inputs (Miellet et al., 2013). 
We hope that in the future this method may provide insight 
into understanding not only which locations in the face are 
fixated but also which of the fixated information reaches 
consciousness. 
  
Limitations of this study 
The high amount of drop-out we experienced is clearly a 
limitation. While the results of the present work should 
therefore be interpreted conservatively, they are in line with 
theoretical predictions for intuitive face judgments and 
present a further case for the global/holistic nature of 
intuitive processes. 
 
What does this mean for the study of intuitive 
processing? 
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To our knowledge, these results constitute one of very few 
studies that directly investigate intuitive judgment 
processes in the context of a socially relevant task. Intuitive 
processes rely on a (tacit) knowledge base acquired 
throughout one’s lifetime. Being surrounded by faces and 
the need to quickly glean meaning from facial categories 
and expressions all of our lives, it is unsurprising that 
having a global impression of a facial expression might well 
be enough to elicit a “gut feeling” of the message we 
interpret a face to be sending. Only those having undergone 
explicit training in subtle expression detection or micro 
expression detection (Ekman, 2006) consciously can 
retrieve the knowledge about which muscle interplay leads 
to what expression (though there seem to be some naturals, 
see O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2005). Nevertheless, as humans 
we are able to move through social spaces and have natural 
conversations with each other, relying on our intuition to 
interpret others’ facial expressions for successful social 
interactions.   
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Conclusion: 
In the present work, we have shown that participants who 
are asked to listen to their gut feeling and decide 
spontaneously if they judge the facial expression they are 
presented with as authentic, reveal markers of 
global/holistic processing. These are a pattern of attention 
localized in the centre of the face, as well as a significantly 
lower number of fixations as compared to the deliberate 
condition. This, to our knowledge, constitutes one of the 
first studies linking intuition and holistic processing in a 
socially, and thereby motivationally salient task. Of course, 
further studies using different ways of operationalizing 
intuition as well as different task-types are necessary to 
validate our findings. Nevertheless, we show that the study 
of eye movement patterns using social stimuli is fruitful in 
the endeavour to elucidate the operating characteristics of 
intuition.   
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Figure Captions: 
• Figure 1: Overview of trial design using exemplary 
stimulus from the FACES database kindly provided 
by Ebner et al (2010). 
• Figure 2: Pixel-wise statistical map showing the 
number of fixations in the stimulus space of the 
intuitive group as revealed by the imap3 analysis. 
Panel (A) shows the statistical pattern of 
distribution of fixations. The colours of the map 
correspond to fixation counts on that particular area 
(see colour scale on the right). Panel (B) shows the 
same pattern mapped onto an example stimulus. A 
one-tailed Pixel test (Chauvin et al.,2005) was 
applied for the group fixation map (p< 1,0). Finally, 
for each condition average Z-score values were 
extracted for each observer individually, within the 
regions showing significance in the differential 
fixation maps. 
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• Figure 3: Pixel-wise statistical map showing the 
number of fixations in the stimulus space of the 
deliberate group as revealed by the imap3 analysis. 
Panel (A) shows the statistical pattern of 
distribution of fixations. The colours of the map 
correspond to fixation counts on that particular area 
(see colour scale on the right). Panel (B) shows the 
same pattern mapped onto an example stimulus. A 
one-tailed Pixel test (Chauvin et al.,2005) was 
applied for the group fixation maps (p< 1,0). 
Finally, for each condition average Z-score values 
were extracted for each observer individually, 
within the regions showing significance in the 
differential fixation maps. 
• Figure 4: Average number of fixations on the 
significant area. Error bars indicate standard error. 
• Figure 5: Average duration of fixations on the 
significant area. Error bars indicate standard error. 
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When it comes to the perception of a person, deviations 
from the (stereotypical) norm can have dire consequences. 
Simply put, whether I am perceived as a woman, or a man, 
or perhaps not easily placed into a binary gendered category 
has immediate and far reaching consequences, such as 
societal inclusion/exclusion, but also access to economic 
wealth, health care and personal safety, to name just a few. 
Similar stereotypic effects take place in the perception of 
sexual diversity. As stated in a recent critical discourse 
analysis of ‘gaydar’ research: “Reducing people to a 
stereotype based on appearance negates their personhood as 
being more than their sexual orientation” (Heitner et al., 
2015). Examples of these implications with respect to 
gender identity and sexual orientation abound in the 
contemporary social landscape. 
In an emergency session held on March 23rd 2016, 
the state of North Carolina passed a bill which restricts a 
person's access to "single-sex public restrooms" to those 
that conform to the sex as "stated on a person's birth 
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certificate". This law effectively discriminates against 
individuals whose gender expression (i.e. the outward 
expression of their gender identity) does not match the 'sex' 
category on their birth certificate. Moreover, since most 
people do not carry their birth certificates around with them 
on a regular basis, individuals who do not conform to 
stereotypical forms of gender expression are thus barred 
from entering those public restrooms that conform to their 
gender identity. Plainly said, a person who is perceived as 
male cannot enter a female restroom, even if said person 
identifies as female. The importance of this matter is 
underscored by a recent analysis conducted by the Williams 
Institute and published in June 2016 (Flores et al., 2016), 
which found that about 1.4 million adults in the United 
States identify as transgender – a number that is twice as 
large as previously estimated. As Kath Woodward 
succinctly put it: “While there is increasing acceptance, at 
least in some parts of the world, about the right to adopt the 
sexual orientation which feels appropriate and possibly 
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natural, the freedom to identify with either sex is more 
troubling in that sex is embedded in systems of governance; 
it is usually the second box you have to fill in on official 
forms after your name” (Woodward, 2016). 
Research on person perception has uncovered valuable 
insights into areas such as impression formation and the 
effect of stereotypes both in how people are perceived and 
how people (unconsciously) alter their behavior due to the 
knowledge that they are being perceived (Allport, 1954; 
Brewer, 1988; Uleman, 1999; Fiske et al., 1999; see 
Schiller et al., 2009 for a discussion of the neural basis of 
impression formation). 
Still, the basic perceptual and cognitive processes 
which contribute to the formation of judgments and 
impressions warrant closer attention. Therefore, with the 
present work we seek to elucidate differences in perceptual 
processes between heterosexual and queer individuals 
when categorizing the gender identity and sexual 
orientation of target faces. The relationship between visual 
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perception and the social/cultural practices these visual 
processes are trained on is dynamic and bi-directional. We 
know today that person perception (face perception being a 
subset of this) is an intuitive process. That is, perceiving 
category and trait characteristics of others happens 
automatically, without much conscious thought or effort 
and accompanied by some (metacognitive) ‘gut feeling’ 
(Ambady, 2010; Rule and Ambady, 2008; Willis and 
Todorov, 2006). However, we also know that intuition is 
trained on variables learned throughout one’s lifetime 
(Betsch, 2008b; Hogarth, 2001; Hodgkinson et al., 2008). 
This is often termed a ‘tacit’ knowledge base, i.e. 
knowledge that drives behavior but is not consciously 
accessible (Bowers et al., 1990). Taken together with 
findings on the malleability of social judgments (Johnson 
et al., 2015; Blair, 2002), this means that while the 
perceptual mechanisms underlying the categorization and 
judgment of others may appear to be somewhat inevitable 
because of their automatic and implicit occurrence, there is 
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actually much work to be done by individual members of 
society and policy makers alike to influence the formation 
of the knowledge base on which intuition relies. In fact, 
knowing that impression formation relies heavily on 
perceptual experience, and perceiver preferences are geared 
towards prototypical category exemplars (Lick and 
Johnson, 2014) underscores the importance of ensuring a 
diversity in potential perceptual experience to combat 
detrimental effects such as prejudice formation. 
Furthermore, elucidating ways in which harmful 
social practices such as prejudice and discrimination can be 
combatted requires us to not only ask the question how (do 
we perceive others), but also what motivates us to perceive 
them in the way we do. We do not make inferences about 
other people based on their face because we are at the mercy 
of our intuitive perceptual processes, but because intuitive 
face perception functions as a tool for adaptive behavior. 
We want to quickly glean information from another 
person’s face because we have intrinsic goals and 
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motivations, such as finding a mate or knowing who poses 
a threat to our personal safety (or our privileged space in 
society). This complex interplay between perceiver 
characteristics and the perceived stimulus is outlined in 
detail in the ecological theory of face perception 
(Zebrowitz-McArthur and Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz et al., 
2011), which will be explained in more detail below. 
How a person's sex/gender is perceived by others is 
an issue that has also kept the International Olympic 
Committee busy for a number of years now. When Caster 
Semenya finished the 2009 World Championship final 8oo 
meter race well before her competition at 1:55.45 seconds, 
voices calling her sex-gender into question were soon 
raised high. What followed was her suspension from 
competition by the International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) and the administration of ‘sex testing’ 
by both IAAF and IOC. Amid a flurry of speculations and 
accusations, Semenya retreated into hiding to escape public 
scrutiny and humiliation (Karkazis et al., 2012). Gender 
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verification tests in sport constitute the attempt to establish 
some “scientific, incontrovertible truth about sex” 
(Woodward and Woodward, 2009). Alongside issues of 
transgender and intersex persons’ rights, stereotypical 
cultural notions of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' have a firm 
hold on personal lives and come entangled with issues of 
social hierarchy, power and history, to name just a 
few. Feminist discourse continues to outline the 
entanglements of sex/gender differences in behavior and 
biology in detail (e.g. Fine, 2012; Joel and Fausto-sterling, 
2016; Springer et al., 2012; Jordan-Young and Rumiati, 
2012) such that addressing all of the different angles and 
tensions would go beyond the scope of this article.  
Researchers have been called upon to examine “how 
perceptions may change as a function of exposure and 
attitudes towards sexual minorities” (see Brambilla et al., 
2013) and with this first study we would like to begin our 
contribution to answering that call, in a critically reflected 
and non-essentialist manner. Thus, our aim with this study 
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was two-fold. We set out to study the following two 
research questions:  
1) Does sexual orientation predict the reliance on gender-
typicality to categorize the gender identity and sexual 
attraction of faces? 
2) Do individuals who self-identify as heterosexual differ 
from queer individuals in the cognitive processing 
strategy employed to judge the gender and sexual 
identity of others?  
Faces are among the most important social signals for 
primates (Atkinson and Adolphs, 2011). It is therefore 
rather unsurprising that we humans (along with several 
non-human animals) have developed dedicated neural 
systems – starting with specialized neural cells and 
including processing pathways – preferentially forged for 
faces as stimulus/input (Kanwisher and Yovel, 2006; 
Kanwisher et al., 1997). Dominant models of face 
perception trace their origins back to Bruce and Young 
(1986), who first proposed a dual process distinction 
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between extracting category and identity information (early 
processing) and expressive information (later in the process 
model) from faces. This framework has since been adapted 
and expanded, and garnered considerable support from both 
cognitive and neurological data (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; 
Haxby et al., 2002, 2000).  
Recently, attempts have been made to include an 
ecological perspective into the study of face processing, 
drawing on a Gibsonian approach to perception (Gibson, 
1979) by including the idea of social affordances22. 
Zebrowitz and colleagues draw on both the classical work 
of the dual process model as well as the face space approach 
(Leopold et al., 2001; Valentine et al., 2014), which holds 
that “the information provided by faces is coded relative to 
an average face on a mental face-space” (Zebrowitz-
                                                 
22 Opportunities for acting or being acted upon that are provided by 
other people 
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McArthur and Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz et al., 2011). In 
proposing the ecological theory of face perception, the dual 
process and face space models are joined with the 
Gibsonian idea of social affordances to draw attention to 
the function of face perception. “We can expect different 
social interactions with people who have different 
identities, show different facial expressions, or look toward 
or away from us. Other attributes revealed in the face 
include familiarity, age, and attractiveness, and each is 
also associated with the perception of behavioral 
affordances” (Zebrowitz et al., 2011). Keeping the 
ecological lens to look at the question of categorization, a 
framework emerges in which the person perception system 
is attuned to stimulus properties which afford it the best 
possible opportunities to guide goal attainment of the 
perceiver. With regards to gender identity and sexual 
orientation judgments, the attuned-to properties might 
include (but are not limited to) social threat (coming out as 
queer to a heterosexual person can pose threatening 
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consequences ranging from ostracism to the death penalty, 
depending on cultural background and social situation), 
mating choice, and economic opportunity. The ecological 
approach thus assumes an interplay between stimulus and 
perceiver through (social) behavioral affordances, i.e. 
opportunities for goal-directed action, and perceiver 
attunements. Anchored in this ecological framework and 
the knowledge that face categorization is most often 
intuitive and perceivers rely on overall impressions of the 
compatibility of sex and gender cues to determine the 
sexual orientation of others (Freeman et al., 2012; Johnson 
et al., 2015; Rule et al., 2008) we propose the following two 
hypotheses: 
• H1: Because of differences in perceiver 
attunement (e.g. visual exposure, implicit 
attitudes, and personal motivation) we predict 
that heterosexual individuals rely on an intuitive 
processing style to judge the sexual orientation 
of faces. 
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• H2: Because of differences in perceiver 
attunement (e.g. visual exposure, implicit 
attitudes, and personal motivation) we predict 
that individuals identifying as heterosexual rely 
more on gender typicality cues than individuals 
identifying as queer. 
 
Before delineating the research design of the present work 
in further detail, a closer look at vocabulary seems 
necessary to avoid confusion. Firstly, the terms “sex” and 
“gender” are often understood as a base/superstructure 
model, where sex represents the material body and gender 
the social or cultural inscription thereof (Hood- Williams, 
1996; Kirby, 1991). However, “sex is not a pure bodily and 
material fact, but is deeply interwoven with social and 
cultural constructions of gender” ((Kaiser et al., 2009), 
p.50). That is, gendered life experiences become embodied. 
To draw attention towards this entanglement of the social 
and biological (Springer et al., 2012; Dussuage & Kaiser, 
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2012) and step away from the notion of “sex” and “gender” 
as instantiated by two separate and opposing “natural 
kinds” (i.e. male/female, masculine/feminie; Rippon et al., 
2014), we follow Kaiser et al. (2009) in using the term 
sex/gender.  
Furthermore, in the context of our study, we use the 
term “queer” to refer to individuals who identified (marking 
4 or above) as being sexually attracted to persons within 
their same gender identity category (whether exclusively, 
or in conjunction with marking 4 or above in another 
category), or the category ‘other genders’ (4 or above). The 
word “queer” was historically reclaimed by lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals and transgender persons to subvert its derogatory 
meaning (Jagose 2001, 97). However, as Hofstätter (2008) 
points out in her introduction to Queer Science and 
Technology Studies: “the term has not automatically 
become neutral: Its meaning depends on the respective 
context and on the attitude of the person using it.” It is also 
worth making the disclaimer, that the results presented in 
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the present work and the interpretations thereof are based 
on the study of Caucasian-European individuals who were 
asked to judge Caucasian-European faces. The results are 
therefore limited in their scope to the Caucasian-European 
cultural space, wherein sex/gender and sexuality are 
conceptualized differently than in other cultural contexts. A 
broadening of the scope to include different cultural and 
ethnic contexts would have been challenging insofar, as not 
only concepts of sex/gender and sexuality differ among 
cultures (Connell, 2012; Schippers, 2007; Fausto-Sterling, 
2000), but also eye-movement patterns are differentially 
influenced by cultural upbringing (Caldara et al., 2016). 
These confounding factors would therefore have introduced 
added layers of complexity, thereby limiting the realm of 
interpretation of the study’s results. 
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II. Research Design 
II.1 Participants and Instruction 
Twenty-nine healthy, right-handed volunteers were 
included in this study and compensated monetarily for their 
participation. Three participants were excluded from 
analysis, either due to technical difficulties during scanning 
or because post session questioning revealed a non-
adherence to instruction, resulting in 26 participants in 
total. Informed consent was obtained from each participant 
prior to the experiment according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki (Version 2013). The local ethics committee of the 
University of Tuebingen approved the experimental 
standards. Data was handled anonymously. All participants 
were native German speakers, had no history of 
neuropsychiatric disorders, and were not currently taking 
psychoactive medications. 
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II.1 Self-Assessment of participants 
One of the methodological criticisms raised by critical 
feminist scholars is that biases about a person’s gender 
identity and sexual orientation exist not only as area of 
scientific inquiry, but also within science itself (see e.g. AG 
Queer STS, 2013; Kaiser & Dussauge, 2015). More 
specifically, as scientists we are not immune to (implicit) 
biases and as such should strive to critically reflect on the 
way our own positions and values may influence our 
research. Following from this, we decided to create a self-
assessment by which participants were asked to indicate 
their gender identity and sexual attraction towards others on 
multiple scales, allowing for a mosaic of gender and 
sexuality categories, as has been shown for the biological 
and behavioral determinants of gender (Joel et al., 2015). 
We thereby attempted to allow persons to report their 
gender and sexual identity without being restricted to the 
male/female binary used as standard on most psychological 
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surveys. 
 
 
Figure 1: Scales for self-identification of gender identity 
of the participants. 
The scales were modeled after recommendations of the Trans Student 
Equality Resources (TSER; http://www.transstudent.org/gender). We 
used the term “queer” to refer to those individuals who marked 
themselves as sexually attracted within their same gender identity 
category (choosing 4 or above), or in conjunction with marking 4 or 
above in another category, or marking their attraction as 4 or above 
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on the ‘other gender(s)’ scale.23 Sexual attraction scales were 
identical, with the preceding question: “Which gender(s) do you feel 
sexually attracted to?” 
 
II.2 Task Outline 
The experiment was divided into two tasks, both of which 
were performed directly after each other.  
Gender: 
Participants were asked to judge the gender identity of the 
displayed face (Response options: (1) female, (2) male, or 
                                                 
23 While we realize that by grouping participants in this manner we are 
re-introducing a kind of classification or categorization that the self-
assessment was designed to avoid, with a study design as complex as 
the present one, data analysis would have been impeded tremendously 
if this categorization had not been performed. We do hope, however, 
that by giving participants many more degrees of freedom than is 
standard in psychological studies and basing our classification on 
participants’ answers, to have moved at least one step closer to 
capturing ‘real life’. 
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(3) other gender). After completing each gender identity 
judgment, participants indicated how confident they were 
in their answer, on a scale from one (low confidence) to 7 
(high confidence). This confidence rating is a standard test 
of metacognitive judgment, which is implicated in intuitive 
processing. Specifically, metacognitive evaluations such as 
the ‘feeling of rightness’ have been shown to act as a kind 
of monitoring mechanisms, arising as the output of an 
intuitive judgment to determine whether further analytical 
reasoning is engaged (Thompson et al., 2011). 
 
Sexual Attraction: 
Participants were asked to judge what gender they 
perceived the displayed face to be sexually attracted to 
(Response options: (1) female, (2) male, or (3) other 
gender).  Following each judgment, participants indicated 
how confident they were in their answer, on a scale from 
one (low confidence) to 7 (high confidence).  
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Figure 2: Exemplary overview of task outline (here: 
gender identity task). 
 
II.3 Stimuli: 
The stimuli, created using FaceGen 3.5 (Singular Inversion 
Inc.), were broadly divided into two categories, separable 
by cues which are stereotypically assigned the labels 
‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’, in Western-European contexts. 
We chose eight detail textures pre-defined by the program. 
Four of these contained what could be considered as lipstick 
and painted eye-lashes (subsequently termed category 
“Lips & Lashes”), the other four featured a combination of 
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bushy eyebrows and/or noticeable facial hair (beard, 
stubble, or mustache; hereafter termed category “Beard & 
Brows”). For each texture, we used the random face 
generator provided in FaceGen to create six different face 
identities per texture (achieving 24 identities per 
category)24. All 48 identities were subsequently morphed 
(shape and texture) in four steps ranging from ‘very female’ 
and ‘female’ to ‘male’ and ‘very male’, using the pre-
defined gender-morph options provided by the software. 
These phenotypic features are based on parameters 
observed in several hundred three-dimensional face scans 
of the human population (Blanz and Vetter, 1999). We 
thereby created 192 individual stimuli, differing in the 
                                                 
24 The race morphing option of FaceGen was locked to ‘European 
Racial Origins’, since the participants of the present study were 
exclusively of European and gender/sexuality categorization as well as 
viewing patterns of faces show cultural variation and culturally diverse 
faces would therefore have introduced a confound. 
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stereotypically gendered facial features (“Lips & Lashes”/ 
“Brows & Beard”) and morphed along a continuum from 
very female to very male.  
 
Figure 3: Example face identity in category “Lips & 
Lashes”, along the morph-level continuum: ‘very female’, 
‘female’, ‘male’, ‘very male’. 
 
We chose to keep the faces without hairstyle to facilitate an 
intuitive judgment mode via the stimulus material. Previous 
research has shown that the process by which social 
category information is extracted depends in part on the 
presence of obvious cues (such as hairstyle for sex/gender 
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judgments), such that if participants cannot rely on obvious 
cues an intuitive judgment mode is preferred (Rule et al., 
2008).  
While the use of computer-generated faces may seem 
an odd choice, it allowed us to systematically alter and 
control various facial features and thereby allow for more 
accurate interpretation of cue-directed eye movements and 
participant judgments. Furthermore, the perceptual 
mechanisms underlying gender-related judgments have 
successfully been tested using a stimulus set modeled on 
FaceGen (Lick and Johnson, 2014). 
II. 4 Procedure 
Participants first filled out the self-assessment sheets 
mentioned in the previous section. Upon completion, they 
were given written instructions for the task and allowed 
ample time for reading and asking clarifying questions (for 
detailed instructions, see supplementary information). The 
experimenter then asked participants to repeat the 
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instructions in their own words, to ensure that everything 
had been understood. Subsequently, participants were led 
into the behavioral room in which the study was conducted. 
Individuals were seated in front of a screen (17’ TFT), on 
which the stimuli and task were presented. First, a five-
point calibration routine was shown to participants, in order 
to calibrate the eye-tracker to the individual. Afterwards, 
participants familiarized themselves with the design of the 
task in three test trials and were given time to ask any final 
questions. Finally, participants began the study by pressing 
a button, starting with either the gender or the sexual 
orientation task. All instructions were shown on the 
computer screen, allowing participants upon completion of 
the first task to proceed to the second one on their own. 
II. 5 Aparatus 
Stimuli were presented and eye movements recorded at a 
sampling rate of 60Hz with the Tobii T60 Eyetracker (Tobii 
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Technologies), using binocular tracking. The experiment 
was implemented in Matlab (2012b The MathWorks, 
Natick, MA, USA), using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
(PTB-3). Calibrations of eye fixations were conducted at 
the beginning of the experiment using a five-point fixation 
procedure provided in the software development kit. 
Calibrations were then validated with a customized Matlab 
script (Tobii Calibration Psychtoolbox) kindly provided by 
Brian Sullivan25. 
II. 6 Data Processing and Analysis 
Behavioral data was analysed using the Statistical toolbox 
running on Matlab 2014b (The MathWorks, Natick, MA, 
USA) as well as SPSS Version 23 (IBM). Eyetracking data 
was analysed using the iMap toolbox (version 4, Caldara 
                                                 
25 freely available online: 
https://visionresearchblog.wordpress.com/2014/10/31/masterclass-
follow-up/ 
228 
 
 
and Miellet, 2011), running on Matlab 2014b. Eye 
movement data was filtered for fixations using a velocity 
threshold of 30ms (REF: I-VT). The resulting single trial 
fixation map was convoluted with a 2D gaussian kernel 
function (FWHM at 1° visual angle) to account for spatial 
offset of the eye movement recordings. Spatial 
normalization was performed by Z-scoring the fixation map 
across all pixels independently for each trial. We then 
applied a full model on the single trial fixation duration 
map: 
PixelIntensity ~ Participant Sexual Orientation + Task + 
Stimulus Category + Morph + (1| subject) 
The model was subsequently fitted with maximum 
likelihood estimation, entering subject as random effect. 
After model fitting, we performed an ANOVA to test main 
effects and interactions. A bootstrap test using 1000 
resamples with cluster density as criterion was performed 
to account for multiple comparisons. 
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II. 7 Post-Session Questionnaire 
After the two tasks were completed, participants filled out 
a questionnaire detailing their judgment strategy, as well as 
answering specific questions about where they focused first 
and which features they perceived as being most important 
for their judgment choice (see suppl. information). 
III. Results 
III.1 Behavioral 
Two independent general linear mixed model analyses 
were conducted, modelling the effects of task, group, 
stimulus category and morph-level on the target judgments 
of (1) male and (2) female on a trial-by-trial basis. Subject 
was entered into analysis as random variable. Participant 
sexual orientation did not have a significant effect on male 
or female response option for the judgment of gender 
identity (see table 1 below). However, judgments of sexual 
attraction did differ significantly between the two groups, 
for both ‘male’ and ‘female’ responses. These differences 
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will be revealed in more detail in the following (section 
III.1.2). 
  
Table 1: Highest significant interactions of the model coefficients in 
the GLMM analyses 
Response 
Option 
Task Coefficient F-stat p-Value 
female Gender ID 
judgment 
Group:Morph 5.061 0.002 
male Gender ID 
judgment 
Group:Category 
 
10.352 0.001 
  Group:Morph 2.640 0.048 
female Sexual 
attraction 
judgment 
Group:Category 
   :Morph 
7.165 0.001 
  Group 5.338 0.0209 
male Sexual 
attraction 
judgment 
Group:Base: 
Morph 
2.777 0.040 
  Group 3.892 0.049 
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III.1.1 Gender Identity Judgments 
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III.1.1.1 Categorization trends across groups: 
Category “Lips & Lashes”:  
Morph levels ‘female’ and ‘very female’ were 
categorized as female by both groups, whereas 
morph levels ‘male’ and ‘very male’ were 
categorized as male. 
Category “Beard & Brows”:  
All morph levels except for ‘very female’ were 
categorized as male by both groups, with slightly 
more variations in categorizations by queer 
participants. The morph level ‘very female’ shows 
the highest variation of all categories independent 
of participant sexual orientation, and is the only 
stimulus category to be categorized most often as 
‘other gender’. 
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III.1.1.2 Categorization trends across stimulus 
categories: 
Comparing morph levels across stimulus categories, we can 
see that the addition of facial hair significantly changes the 
gender identity judgment for both heterosexual and queer 
participants. The morph level ‘female’ is most often judged 
as male by both groups (hetero: 72.50%; queer: 63.55%), 
followed by other gender. This stands in contrast to the 
judgment of morph level ‘female’ in the “Lips & Lashes” 
category (that is, without facial hair and with the addition 
of eye and lip make-up), for which the judgments are 
predominantly female (hetero: 61.39%; queer: 59.94%).  
Overall, the judgments of gender identity closely 
resembled the morph-level of the stimuli, when in 
accordance with the secondary cues (such as facial hair). In 
those categories, where dissonance was created between 
secondary cues (e.g. facial hair, ‘painted’ lashes) and morph 
level (such as faces from category B, morph-level f), 
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judgments followed the secondary cues rather than morph 
level (i.e. faces in above mentioned category were judged 
as “male” in more than 60% of cases).  
III.1.1.3 Explicit confidence judgments  
The explicit confidence judgments arguably represent data 
points on an ordinal scale. We therefore conducted an 
independent-sample Mann-Whitney U test to compare the 
mean confidence judgments of both groups. On a single 
trial level, we found significant differences in mean 
confidence between individuals identifying as queer and 
those identifying as heterosexual (Standardized U =3.246, 
p = 0.001). However, aggregated by overall mean 
confidence judgment per participant, the Mann Whitney U 
test did not reveal significant differences between queer and 
heterosexual individuals (Standardized U = 0.763, p = 
0.763). Tests were adjusted for multiple comparisons using 
Bonferroni correction. 
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III.1.1.4 Reaction Time: 
Participant reaction time was modeled as a function of 
participant group, stimulus category and morph using a 
repeated measures analysis of variance. The speed of 
gender identity judgments did not differ significantly 
between the two groups (F (1,24) = 0.480, p = 0.495). 
 
III.1.2 Sexual orientation judgments 
In the judgments of sexual attraction overall, the difference 
between groups is much more pronounced that in the 
gender identity judgments, with the non-heterosexual group 
showing more variance in judgments. Nevertheless, sexual 
attraction to a gender that is not within the same category 
(i.e. heterosexual preference) remains the favored 
judgment. 
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III.1.2.1 Categorization trends across groups: 
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Category “Lips & Lashes”:  
Morph levels ‘female’ and ‘very female’ were judged as 
sexually attracted to males by both groups, whereas morph 
levels ‘male’ and ‘very male’ were judged as sexually 
attracted to females. When compared with the gender 
identity ratings, a pattern of heterosexual categorization 
emerges as most often chosen sexual orientation judgment, 
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independent of the participants’ own sexual orientation. 
However, queer participants show a higher variance in 
judgments of sexual attraction over all morph levels than 
the heterosexual group.  
Category “Beard & Brows”:  
While morph levels ‘male’ (hetero: 83.7%; queer: 67.7%) 
and ‘very male’ (H: 94.7%; Q: 78.3%) are both judged most 
frequently as sexually attracted to females, morph levels 
‘female’ and ‘very female’ reveal the most divergent 
judgment pattern between the two groups. Morph level 
female is most frequently judged as sexually attracted to 
females, by heterosexual participants (70%). Queer 
participants judged this morph level to be attracted to 
females (41.5%) almost as often as attracted to males 
(36.1%). These difference in judgment drive the significant 
difference between the two participant groups. Importantly, 
both participant groups most frequently categorized morph 
level ‘female’ faces of category “Beard & Brows” as male 
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in the gender identity judgment task. Taking this into 
account, heterosexual participants judge this stimulus 
category as heterosexual, whereas queer participants judge 
this stimulus category as either heterosexual or queer. 
Morph level ‘very female’ again revealed itself to be the 
most divergent stimulus category in terms of participant 
judgments. Whereas heterosexual participants judged faces 
of this type to be sexually attracted to females (42.8%) most 
frequently, followed by attraction to other genders (31%) 
and males (26.2%), queer participants most frequently 
judged these faces to be attracted to other genders (41.2%), 
followed by attraction to males (31.2%), and females 
(26.8%). 
 
III.1.2.2 Explicit confidence judgments: 
An independent-samples Mann-Whitney U Test revealed 
significant difference in confidence intervals between the 
two groups (Standardized U = -9.595, p < 0.001) on a single 
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trial level, such that queer participants were less confident 
in their judgments of sexual orientation (M= 4) than 
heterosexual participants (M= 5). However, aggregated by 
overall mean confidence judgment per participant, the 
Mann Whitney U test did not reveal significant differences 
between queer and heterosexual individuals (Standardized 
U= -1.178, p = 0.270). Tests were adjusted for multiple 
comparisons using Bonferroni correction. 
 
III.1.2.3 Reaction Time:  
A repeated measures analysis of variance testing the effects 
of stimulus category and morph-levels (within-subjects) 
and group (between-subjects) on participant reaction time 
did not reveal a significant main effect of group (F(1,24) = 
1.309, p = 0.264). 
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III.1.2.4 Post-Session Answers 
Almost half of participants identifying as heterosexual 
(47%) mentioned using an intuitive strategy, relying on 
their gut feeling or the overall impression of the face to 
judge the gender identity of the depicted person. On the 
other hand, only 17% of participants identifying as queer 
mention the above named markers. However, both 67% of 
heterosexual and 40% of queer participants mentioned 
reliance on specific facial features as strategy – most often 
the mentioned feature was facial hair. Much less 
participants reported a specific strategy for the judgments 
of sexual attraction task. Of the participants who answered 
this question, 17% of queer participants and 33% of 
heterosexual participants reported a reliance on 
intuition/gut feeling/holistic impression. Interestingly, both 
groups of participants overwhelmingly reported looking at 
the eyes of the presented face as first fixation (Hetero: 62%; 
Queer: 63%).  However, more heterosexual than queer 
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individuals reported looking at the overall shape first (H: 23 
%; Q: 18%), whereas more queer individuals reported first 
looking for signs of facial hair in the face (H: 8%; Q: 25%). 
 
III.2 Eye-Tracking Analyses 
To represent and compare the distribution of the number 
and of the duration of the fixations on the face stimuli, we 
relied on the analysis tool imap4 as statistical mapping 
method for fixation data. This data-driven method allows 
for direct comparisons of the differential viewing patterns 
between the two groups without relying on pre-determined 
areas of interest.  
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Figure 5: Comparison of viewing map for heterosexual 
(yellow) versus queer (blue) participants, while viewing 
stimuli of category “Lips & Lashes”, during the sexual 
orientation task.  
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Figure 6: Comparison of viewing map for queer (red) 
versus heterosexual (blue) participants, while completing 
the sexual orientation task. Areas of significant fixation 
differences (uncorrected for multiple comparisons) are 
surrounded by a black line.  
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The fixation map of heterosexual individuals is consistent 
with an intuitive processing strategy for face judgments, 
relying on a global/holistic eye movement pattern located 
centrally in the face. Although the differences in viewing 
patterns did not reach statistical significance after 
correcting for multiple comparisons, a clear trend in 
viewing pattern can be discerned nevertheless. We are 
currently in the planning stages of a follow-up study with 
larger sample size, in order to test the reproducibility of 
these findings. At this point, the conclusions as to 
differences in participant sexual orientation mapping onto 
differences in cognitive style are therefore tentative. 
 
IV. Discussion 
Motivated by the call to examine changes in perception as 
a function of exposure and attitudes towards 
sexual minorities, and the necessity for a critical and non-
essentialist look at cognitive and perceptual processes 
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involved in categorizing gender identity and sexual 
orientation, we set out to study the following research 
questions: 
• Does group membership predict cognitive 
processing style, i.e. do individuals who self-
identify as heterosexual or non-heterosexual differ 
in cognitive strategy when making gender identity 
and sexual orientation judgments?  
• Does sexual orientation predict the reliance on 
gender-typicality cues to categorize the gender 
identity and sexual orientation of faces? 
The theoretical basis for our study was three-fold. Firstly, a 
characterization of intuition as fast, automatic judgment 
process based on tacit knowledge learned throughout the 
lifespan, but unable to be accessed consciously (Gaissmaier 
and Gigerenzer, 2006; Betsch, 2008a; Hodgkinson et al., 
2008). In our understanding of intuition, the acquisition of 
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the tacit knowledge base depends on external factors such 
as an individual’s social and cultural environment, as well 
as internal factors such as personal believes, motivations, 
and attitudes.  
With the limited amount of time available to make 
judgments about others in social situations and cognitive 
resources being a precious commodity in the market of 
every-day life, reliance on intuitive processing for quick 
and accurate social judgments is almost inevitable. In fact, 
intuitive judgments of female sexual orientation, to name 
just one example, are more accurate than when based on 
thoughtful deliberation (Rule et al., 2009). 
Secondly, the nascent field of ‘social vision’ (Adams et al., 
2011a; Johnson et al., 2015) has shown that face perception 
is intuitive and people are able to accurately judge gender 
identity and sexual orientation from faces, even with near 
sub-liminal presentation times (Ambady, 2010; Willis and 
Todorov, 2006). However, a large part of this research has 
utilized binary categories of ‘male/female’ (gender 
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identity) and ‘masculine/feminine’ (facial features), 
presupposing a notion of a bipolar division of sex/gender. 
Impression formation relies on overall evaluations of (what 
is termed) facial masculinity/femininity, such that 
violations of a (culture specific) gender-norm has direct 
consequences for gender identity and sexual orientation 
judgments. In fact, the gender typicality of facial 
phenotypes determines judgments of sexual orientation, 
such that ‘masculine’ women and ‘feminine’ men tend to 
be judged as ‘gay’, whereas ‘masculine’ men and 
‘feminine’ women tend to be categorized as ‘straight’ 
(Freeman et al., 2010). This result holds for judgments of 
faces as well as bodies (Freeman et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 
2015). The present work extends these findings by directly 
manipulating various facial features, as well as allowing for 
non-binary classifications in both tasks and in the self-
identification of the participants.  
Also part of the new ‘social vision’ paradigm, the 
ecological theory of face perception (Zebrowitz-McArthur 
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and Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz et al., 2011) provides the third 
part of our theoretical framework. This ecological 
perspective draws on a Gibsonian understanding of 
perception to posit that the face perception system is 
attuned to stimulus properties which afford the best 
possible opportunities for adaptive behavior of the 
perceiver. Both the encoding as well as the decoding of 
facial features are innately, individually, socially, and 
culturally tuned (Adams et al., 2011b). In other words, the 
ecological approach to face perception invites us to look at 
perception as an interplay between stimulus and perceiver 
through behavioral affordances and perceiver attunements. 
With regard to gender identity and sexual orientation 
judgments, the attuned-to properties might include (but are 
not limited to) social threat, mating choice and economic 
opportunity, to name just a few.  The amalgamation of 
classic face perception models with an ecological 
perspective, and the knowledge base provided by intuitive 
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judgment processes lead to the proposition of the following 
two hypotheses with respect to our research questions: 
• H1: Because of differences in perceiver 
attunement (e.g. visual exposure, implicit 
attitudes, and personal motivation) we predict 
that heterosexual individuals rely on an intuitive 
processing style to judge the sexual orientation 
of faces. 
• H2: Because of differences in perceiver 
attunement (e.g. visual exposure, implicit 
attitudes, and personal motivation) we predict 
that individuals identifying as heterosexual rely 
more on gender typicality cues than individuals 
identifying as queer. 
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VI. 1 Summary of the Findings 
Even though we did not find differences in gender identity 
judgments moderated by participant’s sexual orientation, 
specific differences did occur in the judgments of sexual 
orientation. Specifically, people who identified as queer 
showed more variance in judgments of sexual orientation, 
irrespective of stimulus category or morph-level. 
Additionally, queer participants relied less on gender 
typicality cues for judgments of sexual orientation than 
heterosexual participants. 
Despite these differences in judgment, heterosexual 
desire and male identity emerged as category prototypes for 
sexual orientation and gender identity judgments, 
respectively. Prototypicality is an important construct in 
face perception, since the categorization of faces is 
modulated by the facial typicality of encountered 
exemplars (Blair, 2002; Livingston and Brewer, 2002).  
Seeing as the layout of a person’s ‘face space’ is postulated 
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to be a function of that individual’s perceptual experience 
(O’Toole et al., 2001; Leopold et al., 2001), and 
heteronormativity is the dominant construct governing 
social spaces (Connell, 2012), this finding is not 
particularly surprising. It remains important and relevant, 
nevertheless, since it underscores long-standing feminist 
criticisms of heteronormativity, extending them by a 
cognitive/perceptual dimension. 
These results will be discussed in more detail below, taking 
recent findings in social vision as well as feminist 
neuroscience into account. Since the study of sex/gender 
and sexual orientation has important and direct implications 
for social life, we conclude with some ethical 
considerations with regard to our results as well as to 
research on gender, sex and sexuality in general. 
VI.2.1 Male as prototypical gender identity 
Over 60% of all stimuli, regardless of morph-level or 
secondary stimulus category (facial hair/make-up), were 
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judged as “male”, suggesting that male is the category 
prototype for gender identity of unknown faces. 
Importantly, this result is based on ‘bald’ faces. Hairstyle 
usually is one of the most important cues for perceivers to 
judge the gender identity of faces (Brown and Perrett, 1993; 
Martin and Macrae, 2007). Nevertheless, this result 
suggests that the prototypical gender category for faces 
devoid of hairstyle but differentiated by physiognomy, skin 
color and further secondary cues such as facial hair and 
make-up, is “male”. In a construct central to the sociology 
of gender, Connell (1995) postulates a gender hegemony, 
which operates through the subordination of femininity and 
other (marginalized) masculinities to hegemonic 
masculinity; a process which serves to cement the societal 
structuring through heteronormativity. Conversely, 
identification of a face as ‘female’ seems to require a hyper-
feminization of so-called feminine features, as evidenced 
by the categorization of all faces except morph-levels 
‘female’ and ‘very female’ in category “Lips & Lashes” and 
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‘very female’ in category “Beard & Brows” as male. This 
finding is further supported by studies showing that (in 
Western contexts) female actresses, reporters, politicians 
and models tend towards hyperfeminine features (e.g. a 
high brow line, high cheekbones, wide eyes, small nose 
(Lick and Johnson, 2014; Johnson et al., 2015) as well as a 
cross-cultural bias for feminine female faces.26  
One might have expected to find a greater variety in 
gender identity judgments for queer individuals based on 
the notion that these individuals are exposed to a greater 
variety in gender expression. Social vision research has 
offered the hypothesis that “visual exposure may affect 
social biases by shifting perceptual norms for targets’ 
appearances. That is, stimuli may appear increasingly 
                                                 
26 This restriction of the category ‘female’ to a very narrow window 
of features is in some ways reminiscent to the out-dated surgical 
practice of categorizing clitoris length (see Fausto-Sterling, 2000). 
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normative as perceivers gain additional exposure to them, 
leading to enhanced evaluative judgments.” (Lick and 
Johnson, 2014). In fact, Tshkay et al (2013) interpret the 
differential response bias between heterosexual and queer 
women in their investigation of female sexual orientation 
judgments to be based on the increased likelihood of queer 
women to be familiar with other sexual minorities and 
exposure to sexual diversity. This notion, however, relies 
on presuppositions of queer life and visual exposure that – 
on second glance – do not hold up to scrutiny. Homosexual 
men and women can fall just as squarely within binary 
gender categories (if they so choose) and even define 
themselves based on gendered attributes such as 
‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ (Kippax and Smith, 2001; 
Tskhay et al., 2014). The history of ‘gender inversion’ as 
sign for homosexuality dates as far back as the Victorian 
Era (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Puzzlingly, the concept has 
pervaded throughout the ages and is even used to categorize 
sexual orientation in animals. Female rats, who show 
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‘mounting’ behavior, for example, were classified as 
lesbian whereas male rats who responded to being mounted 
were classified as gay (Beach, 1979). The questions of 
visual exposure and personal attunement become more 
relevant in the judgments of sexual orientation. 
VI.2.2 Heterosexuality as prototypical sexual 
orientation 
The sexual orientation of participants did influence 
differences in the sexual orientation judgments of the 
presented faces, confirming the second hypothesis. Gender 
typicality cues were used more by participants who self-
identified as heterosexual, while non-heterosexual 
participants showed greater variance in judgments. These 
differences were most pronounced in visually ambiguous 
conditions, especially morph-level ‘very female’ in 
category “Beard & Brows”.  
The ease of processing (i.e. fluency) perceptually 
ambiguous facial stimuli has been associated with guiding 
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first impressions (Lick and Johnson, 2015), such that faces 
which perceivers experience as difficult to classify are rated 
less positively than easily classifiable faces. Similarly, 
fluency has been associated with intuitive processing in a 
number of different task domains (Topolinski & Strack, 
2009). The difference in sexual orientation judgments with 
regards to the perceptually ambiguous stimulus categories 
might therefore be driven by a difference in processing 
fluency. More specifically, individuals who self-identify as 
heterosexual and rely more on gender typicality to 
categorize sexual orientation may process perceptually 
ambiguous target faces more fluently, leading to faster 
judgments and higher levels of confidence in these 
judgments. Conversely, queer participants reported more 
difficulty (i.e. less ease of processing) and less confidence 
in sexual orientation judgments, along with taking more 
time to make judgments than heterosexual participants. 
These results further support a possible difference in 
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cognitive strategy as revealed by participants’ sexual 
orientation.  
A recent analysis of several investigations into 
‘gaydar’ found that stereotypic cues confound the detection 
of sexual orientation from facial cues (Cox et al., 2016). 
This highlights the importance of the fact that facial 
features activate stereotyped knowledge about sex/gender 
norms in people’s minds, rather than there being irrefutable 
truth behind the fact that, e.g. facial hair is associated with 
masculinity and therefore any face exhibiting facial hair 
must be male. Social categorization is not simply based on 
perceptual mechanisms. Rather, perceiving category 
differences is impacted by a number of sub-personal 
factors. An example of this are implicit attitudes, such as 
evidenced in the extensive literature on the other race bias 
(Stanley et al., 2008; Xiao et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2011; 
Zhao et al., 2014). Individuals who score highly on 
measures of racial prejudice perceive the intensity of anger 
on a racially ambiguous face as stronger, when they also 
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categorize that face as Black rather than White (Hutchings 
& Haddock, 2008). Similarly, the stereotypical use of 
gender a-typicality to categorize women as lesbians drives 
the judgment of the so-categorized women as physically 
unattractive (Lick & Johnson, 2014). However, the reliance 
on a systematic labeling strategy has been shown to be 
effected by participants’ sexual identities, such that in a 
judgment task of female sexual orientation, heterosexual 
women were more likely to assume the depicted female 
faces to be heterosexual than women identifying as homo- 
or bisexual (Tskhay et al., 2013). 
Similarly, women’s expression of personality traits 
which are termed ‘masculine’ (such as assertiveness) 
responds to shifts in cultural norms on a group level 
(Twenge, 2001), while on a personal level gendered 
behavior is “flexibly responsive to social context and 
experience” (Rippon et al., 2014). This is consistent with 
the ecological view on face perception, stating that 
individual factors such as personal motivation and 
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attitudinal differences influence how we perceive another 
person’s face. Put differently, “what a person perceives in 
faces depends on what information exists, what information 
the person is able to detect, and what information is useful 
to that perceiver." (Zebrowitz et al., 2011). An example of 
this is the finding that homosexual women show enhanced 
sensitivity towards female faces at ovulation, highlighting 
the importance of sexually relevant factors over 
reproductive relevance in the sensitivity of these perceivers 
to the sex/gender of faces (Brinsmead-Stockham et al., 
2008). 
Our findings extend the current literature on the 
influence of perceivers’ own sexual orientation on 
judgments of sexual orientation and gender identity of 
faces, by testing individuals who were allowed to self-
identify their sexual orientation on a broader spectrum than 
is typically used. Furthermore, by directly manipulating 
facial cues and morphology we were able to investigate the 
differential impact of these cues on gender identity and 
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sexual orientation judgments, rather than simply testing 
judgment accuracy. 
 
VI. 3 Ethical Considerations 
The persistence of social inequalities such as access to 
resources, health care, education and personal security 
along lines of gendered- as well as ethnic and economic 
disadvantage remains a global phenomenon27. Seminal 
research on prejudice (Allport, 1954) has already equipped 
us with the warning that social categorization coupled with 
a perceiver’s affective state can contribute to prejudice 
against certain social groups. The ability to perceive 
another as member of one’s one in-group can be 
advantageous for personal and social belonging. 
Conversely, the categorization of persons also has 
                                                 
27 UN  Women  Reports,  S.  (2015).  Available  at:  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WWreports.htm 
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important implications for privacy and safety concerns 
(Heitner et al., 2015), including discriminatory and 
prejudicial practices on the personal as well as national 
level. “Reducing people to a stereotype based on 
appearance negates their personhood as being more than 
their sexual orientation” (Heitner et al., 2015). 
 With facial recognition software becoming 
increasingly ubiquitous and computer vision algorithms 
starting to be trained on transgender face databases to 
accommodate for changes in physiognomy (Mahalingam 
and Ricanek, 2013), the ethical responsibility of researchers 
is becoming ever more relevant/pressing. Taking on this 
responsibility, it is important to us to note that the present 
research is not intended to further possibilities of picking 
out persons according to their sexual orientation from 
crowds. Rather, the present research is intended to further 
the knowledge on how our perceptual system interacts with 
(higher) cognitive processes to apply or override 
stereotypical categories to others. We seek to join other 
264 
 
 
colleagues in social vision research in showing that 
perception has as much to do with the perceiver, as with the 
cues that are being perceived. If as a society we seek to 
change the application of stereotypical knowledge, the 
proverbial “ball” (of responsibility) remains squarely in our 
court. 
 
VI. 4 Limitations of the Study 
The use of computer generated faces naturally creates 
certain limitations for the study of sex/gender and sexual 
orientation judgments. Firstly, the pre-defined gender 
morph settings rely on what can be considered 
exaggerations of gendered physical features (e.g. skin 
color, bone structure). These features were modeled after 
research on phenotypic parameters observed in several 
hundred face scans of the human population (Blanz & 
Vetter, 1999), however, to try to reflect natural variations 
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in facial physiognomy (though this research can, of course, 
be viewed critically as well).  
 Secondly, by broadly dividing participants 
into ‘heterosexual’ and ‘queer’ groups, we may seem to 
reify the same essentialist beliefs about sexual diversity 
which we aimed to dispel with our elaborate self-
assessment. This unfortunate loss of complexity was a 
necessary trade-off to analyze the multifaceted research 
design. It might be fruitful to conduct future studies with 
less independent variables and rather a focus on keeping the 
complex self-identification of participants. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Differences in judgments between the two groups were 
revealed based on the task, stimulus category and morph-
level. Analyzing the judgments more closely, we see that 
these differences are driven by the sexual-orientation task 
and by the higher reliance on gender typicality for 
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heterosexual participants (see below). Previous 
(perceptual) experience or exposure, which arguably forms 
the tacit knowledge base for intuitive face judgments, may 
be a factor in this differential reliance on intuitive 
processing and on gender typicality to judge the sexual 
orientation of others.  
The key feature of intuitive processing, according to 
Betsch (2008), is the automaticity by which it operates on a 
subconscious level. Through automatic processes, multiple 
pieces of information can be sampled and considered 
simultaneously, making intuition the perfect process mode 
for social cognitive tasks, such as person perception. 
Taking perceiver attunement into account, however, one 
could conceive of persons belonging to a ‘sexual minority’ 
considering multiple factors in sexual orientation 
categorization in a thoughtful and sequential manner – a 
mode of processing that is associated with deliberate 
judgment strategies. Simply put, queer persons might be 
motivated (or have learned) to override their intuitive 
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judgment, knowing that they themselves do not fit into the 
stereotypical categories or would not wish to be categorized 
according to these stereotypes (which rely on categories 
learned while living in heteronormative society). While the 
slower reaction time, lesser confidence and greater overall 
variety in sexual attraction judgments all point towards this 
interpretation, this claim needs to be further substantiated. 
To this end, the preliminary eye tracking data, while not 
reaching significance, can tentatively be interpreted as 
further support for a difference in cognitive strategy. 
Based on the results of the present study, it would 
seem that individuals use similar cognitive processes to 
judge the gender identity of a person, irrespective of their 
own sexual orientation. When it comes to judging the 
sexual orientation of another person, however, there are 
differences in cognitive style and judgment behavior, which 
are moderated by the perceiver’s own sexual orientation. 
Despite these differences in judgment, heterosexual desire 
and male identity emerged as category prototypes for 
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sexual orientation and gender identity judgments, 
respectively. 
According to Atkinson and Adolphs (2011), “the 
ultimate goal of constructing a theoretical model of face 
processing is to put both the social back into the face as well 
as the person back into the perceiver (p.363). Mirroring this 
notion, feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz insists that we 
cannot merely “subtract the environment, culture and 
history and end up with nature or biology” (Grosz, 1995). 
Both perspectives highlight the importance of 
acknowledging the entanglements of the person (and all of 
the elements that come with being a person, e.g. culture, 
history, environment) with the act of perceiving another 
person. Contemporary concepts of intuitive judgment 
processes complement this adaptive view of social vision 
by emphasizing the importance of an individuals’ life 
experience for the shaping of the intuitive judgment 
process. In the words of Tilmann Betsch (2008), 
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“Experience provides the organism with a rich database on 
which intuition can unfold its power.”  
By using the knowledge of intuitive judgment 
processes in the context of gender, sex and sexuality studies 
we can draw attention towards experiential factors 
(instantiated through social, cultural and political spaces) 
and thereby step away from reifying essentialist notions of 
gender/sex/sexuality. This perspective highlights the 
importance of directly investigating how intuitive judgment 
processes factor into social perception. It further calls on 
researchers to allow for variations beyond the stereotypical 
in the design as well as the interpretation of their data. Last, 
but perhaps most importantly, these approaches continue to 
show us the importance of acknowledging and promoting 
diversity in society. 
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Chapter IV.4 
What type of feelings are gut feelings? 
Laura F. Mega 
Center for Gender and Diversity Research, University of 
Tuebingen 
 
The equating of one’s intuition to a diffuse, intangible kind 
of feeling in the bottom of one’s stomach or gut is a 
pervasive one. Utterances such as “I have a bad feeling 
about this person” or “My gut tells me that we need to turn 
left at the next light” are commonly used in every-day 
conversation to verbalize an intuitive judgment. This notion 
of intuition being synonymous with gut feelings is also 
echoed within psychology. Gerd Gigerenzer’s widely cited 
book “Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious” is 
just one (prominent) example of this tendency. In his work, 
Gigerenzer notes early on that he uses the words “intuition” 
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and “gut feeling” interchangeably, to describe: “A 
judgment that appears quickly in consciousness, whose 
underlying reasons we are not fully aware of, but that is 
strong enough to act upon.” (Gigerenzer, 2007) 
Despite theories of embodied cognition gaining 
popularity within cognitive science and psychology alike, 
as well as rigorous philosophical discourse around the 
nature of feelings, their role in cognition and correlated 
bodily sensations, the concept of “gut feelings” within the 
literature on intuition seems to be used in ignorance of the 
different feeling concepts. Using two prominent lines of 
empirical inquiry into intuition as examples, I will argue 
that the ‘gut feelings’ under investigation are in fact 
different types of feelings. In order to disentangle the 
conceptual mash-up behind the concept of gut feelings, I 
will draw on theories of emotion as well as embodied 
cognition. I ask the question: If we assume gut feelings to 
play a role for intuitive processes (or even be synonymous 
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to intuition), are the same type of (gut) feelings at play in 
every kind of intuitive process? 
The structure of my treatment of this question is as 
follows: Section one outlines different concepts of intuition 
that propose a role of emotions or feelings, as well as an 
overview of different feeling concepts. Sections two and 
three attempt to answer the question, whether gut feelings 
might map onto the concepts of somatic markers (2), or 
epistemic feelings (3). In sections four and five I introduce 
two independent lines of research into embodied 
components of intuition and attempt to show that the notion 
of gut feelings relies on very different concepts in each one. 
I conclude with an outlook of further interesting avenues of 
research in order to answer the questions posed above. 
Intuition and Feelings 
Many theories related to intuition include the notion that 
intuition has an emotional or affective component. Some 
even go so far as to postulate an “emotions revolution” 
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(Weber & Johnson, 2009, p. 64), which has put affective 
processes on an equal footing with cognitive processes. 
Examples of this can be found not only in the 
aforementioned book by Gerd Gigerenzer, but also within 
dual-systems theory, first proposed by Sloman (1996) and 
later integrated into Daniel Kahnemann’s seminal 
heuristics and biases approach (Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahnemann, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). The theory of dual 
systems divides mental capacities broadly into two systems 
which generate judgments and decisions: an intuitive 
system (1) and a reflective (2) system. Important for the 
current argument is that, according to Kahneman and 
colleagues, System 1 operates in a “fast, automatic, effort- 
less, associative, implicit (not available to introspection), 
and often emotionally charged” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 698) 
manner. Slovic and colleagues even coined a specific 
heuristic, the affect heuristic, in which decision makers may 
base their choice simply on the use of their “intuitive 
affective reaction toward an object or behavior” (Slovic, 
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Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Similarly, dual-
process theories (DPT) -- which are among the most widely 
perceived classes of theories on intuition -- mention a role 
of “emotions” for intuitive (type 1/T1) processes (e.g. 
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Frankish, 2009). This purported 
emotional component of T1 processes falls prey to similar 
issues as the notion of gut feelings. Namely, it is unclear 
which theory of emotions is ascribed to by the authors who 
propose emotions as one characteristic of T1 processes. 
Recent work to shed light on the underdetermination of 
‘emotions’ in decision research found that there has been 
disappointingly little progress in modeling the interaction 
of emotions with decision making, despite a surge in studies 
probing this interaction. The authors conclude:  “it would 
seem that neuroscientific investigations of the interplay 
between emotions and decision making are particularly 
guilty of a ‘grab bag’ approach to emotions.” (Volz & 
Hertwig, 2016). 
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In Plessner and colleagues widely received book on 
intuition in judgment and decision making, four chapters 
were devoted to “Emotion & Intuition” (Plessner, H., 
Betsch, T., Betsch, 2008). The definition of intuition put 
forth by the authors sees intuition as primarily reflecting 
prior experience and capitalizing on stored representations. 
Their view includes a greater contribution of affect and 
emotions to judgment and decision making than many other 
JDM models. It specifically conceives of a feeling that 
guides judgments and decisions as the output of an intuitive 
(thinking) process, such as the feeling of liking an entity or 
a feeling of risk (Betsch, 2008). That is, intuition uses 
feeling as decision criterion. The notion of gut feelings has 
also been utilized directly by myself and others to induce 
an intuitive judgment strategy, by instructing participants to 
follow their gut feelings (e.g. Mega, Gigerenzer, & Volz, 
2015; Mega & Volz, in prep) or gut instincts (e.g. Rule, 
Ambady, & Hallett, 2009) during a particular task. This 
outline of the conceptual and empirical engagement with 
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the contribution of emotions and feelings in the intuitive 
process is by no means an exhaustive overview of the ways 
in which (gut) feelings are treated in the intuition literature. 
The former are merely examples of what part emotions and 
feelings are conceived of playing in the intuitive process, 
taken from some of the most widely cited research of 
intuitive judgment processes. 
Feelings 
One difficulty in disentangling the various notions of gut 
feelings lies in the fact that the nature of feelings, their 
relation to emotions and their function remains a topic of 
debate within and between various disciplines. Are they 
limited to visceral sensations? Or do they include 
musculoskeletal sensations? In a review of the literature on 
interoception and embodiment, Herbert and Pollatos (2012) 
define bodily feelings as the processing of internal (and 
external) signals; the sense of our physical and 
physiological condition. According to Alston’s classic 
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definition, feelings are spontaneously occurring 
phenomenal experiences that form part of the stream of 
consciousness (Alston, 1969).  Perhaps the most prominent 
work on feelings within neuroscience comes from the 
laboratory of A.D. Craig. His research suggests that the 
anterior insular cortex is the neural substrate both of 
subjective feelings from the body and feelings of emotion. 
Craig thus concludes that subjective awareness is built on 
homeostasis and "the homeostatic neural construct for a 
feeling from the body is the foundation for the encoding 
of all feelings” (Craig, 2009). 
Psychologist Tillman Betsch, sees feelings as informing 
conscious thought about the work of the unconscious 
(Betsch, 2008): “They are immediate, nonsymbolic, 
nonverbal; they evolve from experience, demanding only 
a minimal amount of cognitive resources and can serve as 
a basis for judgment and decision.” However, Betsch 
endorses the view that not all kinds of feelings are 
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emotional, or, as he puts it “map on the affective 
dimension”.  Feelings that inform the organism about 
properties of experience such as time, space, and number as 
well as feelings are feelings about cognitive processes, such 
as the “feeling of knowing” (Hart, 1965), are examples of 
non-emotional feelings, according to Betsch.  
On the other end of the spectrum lies the work of 
William James and Carl Lange, who both endorsed the 
view that emotions are caused by bodily expressions 
(James, 1884; Lange, n.d.). In an extension of the James-
Lange Theory, the philosopher Jesse Prinz views bodily 
sensations as the standard (though non-essential) causes of 
emotions (Prinz, 2004, 2005). According to Prinz: 
“Feelings are brain states in perceptual systems. […] An 
emotional feeling is an embodied appraisal that is 
broadcasting to working memory, [...]” (Prinz, 2004, 
P.242). Zeelenberg and colleagues endorse the view that 
“feeling is for doing”. The authors, who also follow the 
James-Lange tradition, equate feeling with emotion. 
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Importantly for the discussion of gut feelings, they 
understand emotions as “programs for intuitive decision 
making, imposing on the decision maker inclinations for 
action that, in a given situation, most adequately serve 
current strivings.” (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, & Pieters, 2008). 
Having gained a small glimpse into what feelings are 
thought to be (nature) and to be for (function), we are still 
left with many questions. For example: are these kinds of 
feelings located somewhere in the body? When do they 
enter awareness, thereby influencing the judgment process? 
If they are the output of an intuitive process, why is it that 
gut feelings are by some authors conceived of being 
synonymous to intuition? 
 
 Table 1: Summary of different feeling concepts 
Feelings are spontaneously occurring 
phenomenal experiences that form part of the 
stream of consciousness.  
(Alston, 1969) 
Subjective feelings from the body are the 
foundation of all feelings 
Craig (2009) 
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Feelings evolve from experience, do not 
require many cognitive resources and can 
serve as basis for judgments and decisions. 
Feelings can either be emotional/affective or 
non-emotional (such as metacognitive 
feelings). 
Betsch (2008) 
Emotions are caused by bodily expressions (i.e. 
feelings) 
William James 
(1884) 
Feelings are brain states and emotional 
feelings are embodied appraisals 
Jesse Prinz 
(2004) 
Feelings are emotions and emotions are 
“programs for intuitive decision making” by 
evoking action tendencies towards goal 
attainment. 
Zeelenberg, 
Nelissen & 
Pieters (2008) 
Are gut feelings somatic markers? 
Based on the plethora of feeling-concepts outlined above, it 
seems prudent to take a closer look at two strands of 
research to better understand the types of feelings 
underlying the notion of gut feelings, namely (1) the 
somatic marker hypothesis (henceforth referred to as SMH) 
and the (2) literature on metacognitive (or epistemic) 
feelings. 
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Evaluating the nature of gut feelings and attempting 
to clarify the use of such feelings in intuition cannot be 
attempted without taking a close look at the somatic marker 
hypothesis (hereafter: SMH), which has greatly influenced 
the concept of gut feelings in intuition (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994;Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 1997). Following in the tradition of the James-
Lange Theory, SMH theorists view emotions as arising 
from bodily expressions. According to the SMH, somatic 
markers are brain states that index changes in the autonomic 
nervous system, while at the same time becoming 
associated with the representations of objects or events in 
the world that trigger them (see Bartol & Linquist, 2015, 
for a review of the somatic marker hypothesis in decision 
making). Thus, on Damasio's view, emotional feelings are 
constituted by meta-representations of bodily states. It is 
the conscious access of these emotional feelings which 
provide the "gut feelings" that guide our decision 
processes. Notably, the SMH to this date remains one of the 
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few – and certainly, the most widely cited – theories of the 
function of bodily signals for (intuitive) decision making. 
One of the classical tasks used to study the SMH is 
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, 
& Damasio, 1997). The IGT is a card selection task in 
which individuals learn which of four decks of cards is the 
most rewarding. Participants select cards from these decks 
and immediately either earn a (facsimile) cash reward, or a 
penalty.   Card selection earns participants monetary 
rewards or punishments. The decks are differently valued 
and without the knowledge of participants, valence of the 
decks is switched half-way through the experiment. Results 
of the IGT have shown that autonomic responses (measured 
by skin conductance) predict the switch to more rewarding 
decks. This autonomic response is defined as somatic 
marker or “gut feeling”. According to Damasio, gut feelings 
are especially relevant indicators in situations of 
uncertainty and complexity, when we are free to decide 
upon our own actions. Most often, however, gut feelings are 
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mentioned as “warning signals” of negative outcomes 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; see also 
Herbert & Pollatos, 2012). 
Despite the prevalence of the SMH, we cannot 
unquestioningly rely on the account of gut feelings as 
outlined in its theory. For one, this would simply replicate 
the mistake made by authors who use the term gut feelings 
in their investigation of intuition without specifying the 
feelings-concept underlying their use of the term. Secondly, 
the SMH has not remained without criticism, even within 
the emotion community itself. Among the most often 
voiced complaints are vagueness and ambiguity in the 
definition of the SMH (Colombetti, 2008; Dunn, Dalgleish, 
& Lawrence, 2006). The widespread adoption of the SMH 
for empirical investigations notwithstanding, it remains 
unclear which functional role(s) somatic markers are 
thought to play in decision-making.  
In a comprehensive review of the SMH literature, 
Linquist and Bartol identified no less than 38 different 
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interpretations of the SMH as alternatives (Linquist & 
Bartol, 2013). The authors follow Colombetti’s (2008) 
division of the SMH literature into SMH-general theories 
(emotions play a role in decision making) and SMH-
specific (lesions to the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex 
impair one’s ability to form long term plans). Importantly, 
in both families of theories, somatic markers are seen as 
positively or negatively valenced and this information is 
thought to be (somehow) included in decision-making. 
Perhaps most importantly for the claim of the 
present work, the SMH operates on a definition of 
intuitiveness which relies on concepts of good/bad choices, 
following the ‘heuristics and biases’ framework. This is 
problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the concept of 
intuition as heuristics is certainly not shared by everyone in 
the intuition community, neither is it applicable for every 
task used to investigate intuitive judgment or decision 
making. Testing semantic coherence using the word triads 
task (Bolte & Goschke, 2005), for example, does not pre-
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suppose correct or incorrect choices. Participants are 
presented coherent or incoherent word triads, such as 
“playing”, “credit”, and “report”. Coherent triads are 
defined to indirectly have a fourth word in common, 
whereas incoherent ones do not. The example above is an 
example of a coherent triad, since all three words are 
weakly associated with the solution word “card”. Those 
trials in which participants accurately judge a triad to be 
coherent but are unable to name the solution word are 
considered cases of intuitive coherence judgments (cp. 
Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Zander et al.,; Ilg et al.). A 
situation in which somatic markers could act as valence 
indicators – signaling the “bad” choice -- simply does not 
exist. A similar logic underlies the test of visual coherence 
(Volz & von Cramon, 2006). Therefore, an optimal 
behavioral strategy in which anticipatory bodily signals 
point to advantageous choices simply cannot be learned in 
these types of tasks. Bodily signals may be taken as 
indicators of coherence, however, which I will explain in 
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further detail in section six. For now, suffice it to say that 
gut feelings can not only be related to the valence marker 
idea as proposed by the SMH in every conceivable situation 
in which a person makes use of her intuition. 
Are gut feelings epistemic feelings? 
Several indications point to the possibility that gut feelings 
might (in some cases?) be considered epistemic feelings (de 
Sousa, 2008). Epistemic feelings, sometimes also referred 
to as metacognitive feelings or noetic feelings, are feelings 
concerning the subject’s own mental capacities and mental 
processes. Examples of epistemic feelings are the feeling of 
confidence, the feeling of knowing, the feeling of error, and 
the feeling of familiarity. Some of the most active 
investigations of epistemic feelings draw on dual-process 
theories (see section 1 above). Examples of this abound in 
the literature on metacognition (e.g. Proust, 2015), 
(Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), (Koriat, 
2006) and (Dokic, 2012). Dokic even uses DPT in his 
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definition of epistemic feelings: “E-feelings are cross-level 
states, produced by implicit, type1 monitoring but 
available to participate in explicit, type 2 reasoning” 
(Dokic, 2012). 
Extending from the previously mentioned dual-
system’s theory, DPT distinguishes two types of mental 
processes used in judgment and decision making: rapid 
autonomous intuitive processes (T1) and reflective higher 
order reasoning processes (T2; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Notably, DPT are among the most widely purported 
theories underlying both empirical as well as theoretical 
investigations into the nature of intuitive processes28. 
Further indications that intuition (and, by extension, gut 
feelings?) is somehow related to epistemic feelings, comes 
from the view that even partial information can lead to a 
                                                 
28 Though the prevalence of DPT has come to be criticized in recent years (Keren & 
Schul, 2009; Mega & Volz, 2014; Osman, 2013). 
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strong “feeling of knowing” by making use of sub-personal 
heuristics (such as cue familiarity). This idea is reminiscent 
of Gigerenzer’s proposal of an adaptive toolbox of 
(subpersonal) heuristics, such as the recognition heuristic, 
as intuitively used and building blocks of ecological 
rationality (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2009). Equally related to the adaptive toolbox 
account (and, in some ways, the SMH) is the notion that 
feeling-based metacognition evolved as a coping 
mechanism for mental uncertainty (Arango-Munõz & 
Michaelian, 2014). Thus far, I have presented evidence of a 
link between epistemic feelings and intuition. Some 
researcher’s even go so far as to equate epistemic feelings 
with intuitions29 (Arango-Muñoz, 2014). Could gut 
                                                 
29 It has been pointed out, however, that the term “intuition” is conceptually and 
theoretically loaded with very different concepts in philosophy than in psychology, which 
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feelings, then, be conceived of as epistemic feelings? Let’s 
look at this a bit more closely. Beyond establishing a link 
between intuition and epistemic feelings, we need to ask 
whether epistemic feelings also have a bodily component. 
Are they embodied in the way that gut feelings imply a 
bodily component of intuitive processing? There is 
increasing evidence that this is indeed the case. 
Epistemic feelings, like other types of feelings, are 
embodied: they are directed to an internal condition of the 
subject’s body, in the sense of being caused by or attached 
to certain bodily reactions (Arango-Muñoz, 2014; Prinz, 
2004). On the Water Diviner Model of noetic feelings 
proposed by Dokic, noetic feelings are first and foremost 
experiences about bodily signals (Dokic, 2012).  Evidence 
for the embodiment of noetic (or epistemic) feelings can be 
                                                 
is why some philosophers prefer to avoid the term “intuition (Arango-Munoz, personal 
correspondence). 
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found in the study of facial expressions. Facial feedback 
influences the felt experience during a given task (e.g. 
Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010). 
Furrowing one’s brow, for example, enhances the feeling 
of mental effort or uncertainty (Asher Koriat & Nussinson, 
2009), as well as undermining perceived judgments of fame 
(Strack & Neumann, 2000). When people are asked to 
decide whether they recognize a certain target (i.e. whether 
they have encountered it previously), people attribute 
artificially enhanced perceptual fluency to memory for 
prior occurrence (Goldinger & Hansen, 2005). A 
subliminal somatic cue (“buzz”) that was administered to 
participants unrelated to the test items presented to them 
increased the likelihood of participants responding that they 
had previously seen the item. This effect only occurred for 
subjectively more difficult items. Thus, the sensation of the 
buzz seems to be credited to stimulus familiarity. Notably, 
this illusion of familiarity did not occur in participants who 
experienced an obvious buzz. In discussing their results, 
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Goldinger and Hansen argue that: “Given difficulty in 
recollection, people rely on ‘‘gut feelings’’ […], which are 
susceptible to manipulations of fluency or arousal.”. 
Similar evidence for afferent feedback from the autonomic 
nervous system influencing recognition-memory was found 
in a face recognition manipulation using faces presented 
during cardiac systole (maximal visceral feedback) versus 
faces presented during cardiac diastole (minimal visceral 
feedback). In a series of elegant experiments, Fiacconi et al 
(Fiacconi, Peter, Owais, & Köhler, 2016) were able to show 
that faces presented during cardiac systole were more likely 
to be judged as “old” and this influence of cardiovascular 
feedback was specific to those trials in which participants 
reported a feeling of familiarity without successful 
recollection of contextual detail. The evidence reviewed 
here supports the hypothesis that at least some epistemic 
feelings are based on bodily feedback, mirroring the theory 
of emotions as based of the feedback from one’s own bodily 
experience (James, 1884). Might ‘gut feelings’ simply be a 
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poorly defined container term for the different kinds of 
embodied epistemic feelings which play a role in judgment 
or decision-making? 
Playing games with intuition 
The first task I would like to introduce is the “Intuitive 
Reasoning Task” (IRT), which evolved out of the classical 
IGT. The authors’ definition of intuition follows Daniel 
Kahneman’s concept of intuition as: “automatic, emotional 
judgment about whether the contemplated response is a 
good or bad option” (Kahneman, 2003). In the IRT, 
participants learn to distinguish profitable decks of cards 
from unprofitable ones, over the course of 100 trials. The 
intuitive ability of participants is defined, in the context of 
the IRT, as the degree to which an individual learns the so-
called optimal behavioral strategy, following the 
completion of all trials. In each trial, participants choose 
one of four displayed decks and subsequently guess if their 
chosen card is the same color as a single, upturned card 
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displayed in the center of the screen. Monetary loss or gain 
on each trial indicate the correctness of an individual’s 
guesses. Unbeknownst to participants, the outcomes of 
each deck are predetermined by a computer. In the study by 
Dunn and colleagues, which I will use as representative 
example, anticipatory bodily measures (defined as somatic 
markers) were measured using heart rate detection and 
EDA (Dunn et al., 2010). After completion of the IRT, 
interoception was measured using the Schandry heartbeat 
perception task (Schandry & Bestler, 1995). Dunn and 
colleagues found that anticipatory bodily responses (ABRs) 
differed between profitable and unprofitable decks. 
Moreover, ABRs influenced intuitive ability more strongly 
as interoceptive ability increased.  
Taken together, the definition of intuition as well as 
that of intuitive ability make use of quite strong normative 
presuppositions. Learning an optimal behavioral strategy in 
a rigged (online) card game boils down to the individual 
learning to mistrust their own (previous) experience. This 
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conceptualization of “intuitive ability” seems like the polar 
opposite of what humans learn as optimal behavior in the 
wild. It certainly is contrary to the definition of intuition 
proposed by Betsch and colleagues (section 1), in which 
intuition is seen to primarily reflect prior experience and 
capitalizing on stored representations. It is, however, in line 
with the puzzling finding that many studies of rational 
behavior actually find that, contrary to popular belief, it is 
neurological and mental abnormalities seem to foster 
conformity to norms of rational decision making, while 
fully intact cognition stands in the way of rational behavior 
as defined by these (neuro)economic and psychological 
studies (Hertwig & Volz, 2013). 
Why is this difference in definition important? On 
the view of the study authors (Dunn et al), intuition seems 
to boil down to a valence indicator. Which is precisely the 
result they find. The feeling under investigation is 
operationalized as anticipatory bodily signal, directly used 
as valence or value indicator. Thus, this gut feeling could 
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perhaps be conceptualized as bodily appraisal that is 
directly integrated into the decision process, but not as 
emotional or epistemic feeling. As I pointed out in the 
previous section on epistemic feelings, the bodily 
component of epistemic feelings has (thus far) only been 
shown to indirectly influence decisions via changing the 
subjective experience of the individual. The subliminal 
buzz changed the feeling of familiarity and the furrowed 
brow the feeling of mental ease, while those epistemic 
feelings in turn then changed the individual’s judgment. 
It seems that in IGT/IRT participants learn (with immediate 
feedback!) the “normatively correct” answer to the task. In 
social judgments, learning occurs across your lifetime and 
feedback is much more indirect (wondering if the couple 
sitting across from you are lovers or friends, you may never 
actually know the correct answer to, unless you get up and 
ask). Perhaps this is why, in such situation, we rely on e.g. 
a feeling of knowing as a proxy for experiential feedback. 
Thus, bodily feedback such as heart beat detection might 
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actually be much more directly integrated into judgment in 
the IRT tasks than during impression formation.  
Feeling intuitive coherence judgments 
The second example is an investigation into the subjective 
experience of intuitive coherence judgments in the 
semantic coherence task, by examining the effects of affect 
and fluency on such judgments. To reiterate, the semantic 
coherence task requires participants to judge word triads as 
coherent, if they perceive them to have a common solution 
word (such as the triad “playing”, “credit”, and “report” for 
which the common associate is “card”). The study by 
Topolinski & Strack (2009) discussed in the following 
section was based on material developed by Bolte and 
Goschke (2005). Participants were informed about the 
hidden semantic coherence of the triads and were given 
examples of both coherent and incoherent ones. In each 
trial, participants were presented with a word triad and 
subsequently asked to judge the triad as coherent or 
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incoherent. This judgment was restricted to a reaction time 
of 500ms. During the experiment, participants were 
exposed to background music via headphones. To achieve 
reattribution, individuals in the ﬂuency-reattribution 
condition were told: ‘‘Previous research showed that this 
music inﬂuences the easiness of reading and the ﬂuency 
with which the meaning of words is recognized.”, whereas 
in the affect-reattribution condition it was mentioned that: 
‘‘Previous research showed that this music inﬂuences the 
emotional reactions of individuals” (Topolinski & Strack, 
2009). 
Participants’ experience of reading fluency was thus 
reattributed to an unrelated source, in order to discount 
either fluency or affect from their intuitive coherence 
judgments. The authors’ argued that if individuals have the 
experience of both fluency as well as affect upon judging a 
triad as coherent, their intuitive judgments (i.e. judging 
triads as coherent without being able to name the solution 
word) should remain diagnostic in both reattribution 
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conditions, since they could switch from relying on the 
feeling of fluency to affect and vice versa (Topolinski & 
Strack, 2009). However, when participants discounted 
affect from their intuitions, they lost the ability to detect 
coherence (even though they could still rely on processing 
fluency as diagnostic cue). The authors conclude that the 
internal cue that drives intuitive judgments of semantic 
coherence is not fluency of processing, but the positive 
affect triggered by fluency (following the hedonic marker 
hypothesis by Winkielman and colleagues; P. Winkielman, 
Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Further supporting 
the link between affect and fluency, Unkelbach & 
Greifender  (2013) show if the increase in positive affect is 
high or rapid enough, it may be experienced as a cognitive 
feeling of ease. Thus, in the work by Topolinski and Strack, 
both affect and fluency are attributed to intuitive judgments 
(of coherence), although fluency itself is not seen to be 
enough of an internal cue. Summarizing this kind of 
evidence, Winkielman and colleagues argue that: “the 
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integration at the level of subjective experience interacts 
with high-level decisional processes. That is, the exact 
impact of experience on stimulus judgments depends on 
the perceiver’s beliefs about the sources and relevance of 
the experience for the task at hand” (Piotr Winkielman, 
Ziembowicz, & Nowak, 2015).  
Despite the fact that the authors do not use the 
notion of gut feelings in describing their work, Topolinski 
and Strack do link intuition to a feeling and refer to the work 
of Damasio and colleagues (1997) in their definition: 
“intuition is predominantly seen as a feeling that emerges 
from processes operating outside of awareness and then 
enters the individual’s experiential awareness.” However, 
in contrast to the SMH literature and the first empirical 
example in the section above which used the IRT as task, 
the ‘feeling’ under investigation by Topolinski and Strack 
does not map onto the same kind of feeling concept as the 
one used by Damasio. First and foremost, the feeling of 
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fluency and the fluency-induced positive affect cannot be 
seen as valence markers which are “biasing” an individual’s 
judgment in the present study. Rather, the affect cue enters 
into the intuitive judgment as an internal sense of 
coherence, whereas the coherence-triggered fluency does 
not enter into awareness but remains in the fringe of 
consciousness. Nevertheless, since the feeling of fluency is 
the basis of the affective component of the intuitive 
coherence judgment, both affect (‘liking’) and fluency are 
feelings involved in these intuitive judgments. Thus, there 
are arguably two types of gut feelings involved in this 
particular task: affective or emotional feelings and 
epistemic feelings (here: fluency).  
In a similar vein, attempts to empirically investigate 
the arousal and valence elicited by intuitive versus 
deliberate processing strategies via EDA actually came up 
with results contrary to the standard findings in the SMH 
literature. Zander and colleagues employed a semantic 
coherence task (the same one as used in the work by 
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Topolinski and Strack introduced above) to test whether 
arousal and valence markers would differ between task 
blocks in which individuals employed an intuitive versus a 
deliberate strategy for their judgments of coherence. 
Contrary to the classical finding that autonomic (skin 
conductance) response heightens with intuitive ability, 
Zander and colleagues found lower EDA signals for 
intuitive than deliberate task (Zander et al., 2016). 
However, as has been rightfully pointed out elsewhere 
(Herbert & Pollatos, 2012), most of the findings that 
highlight the visceral component of cognitive processes are 
based on correlational data and a causal involvement of 
interoception still needs to be proven. Based on the 
evidence discussed thus far, one might ask in objection: 
Can gut feelings be measured by measuring interoception? 
The answer to this may well depend on your definition of 
gut feelings. 
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Conclusion 
“Human rational behavior is shaped by scissors whose 
blades are the structure of task environment and the 
computational capabilities of the actor.” – HERBERT A. 
SIMON 
I started out by claiming that the term “gut feelings” is used 
to denote different types of feelings in the context of 
intuition research. It is unclear what type of “feeling” 
concept is alluded to by the use of the term (gut feelings), 
or if it denotes any particular concept beyond a colloquial 
synonym for the word intuition. If, however, gut feelings 
boil down to simple valence (and/or arousal?) markers, as 
some seem to suggest, then using the terms intuition and 
gut feelings synonymously, as several authors have been 
wont to do, does not do the strength and usefulness of 
intuitive processes justice. 
Characterizations of intuition differ and not all of them 
mention a component of gut feelings. What you take gut 
feelings to be also depends heavily on your definition of 
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intuition – which differs widely across disciplines (cp. 
Strack & Deutsch, 2015 for an excellent review on this 
topic). As Glöckner and Wittemann put it: “We suggest 
that intuition is used as a label for different kinds of 
automatic processes” (Glöckner & Witteman, 2010). 
The present work is by no means an exhaustive 
overview of the different uses of the concept of gut feelings 
in intuition research. Rather, it is meant as an invitation to 
intuition researchers, to pay attention to the concepts they 
are conjuring through their choice of words and to use rigor 
in defining their theoretical basis such that empirical 
investigations might lead to fruitful results. It might be 
further interesting to look at the intuition literature through 
the lens of critical discourse analysis, to disentangle the 
myriad ways in which ‘gut feelings’ are being appealed to 
linguistically, as part of the intuitive process. 
If by invoking a notion of gut feelings the respective 
author is trying to draw attention to an embodied 
component of intuitive judgment or decision-making, it 
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would be more useful and less confusing to do just that: 
speak of embodiment and thus make use of the knowledge 
base of embodied cognition and emotions. Then, perhaps, 
new avenues of investigation might be illuminated, such as 
testing the three-dimensional model of interoception 
proposed by Garfinkel and colleagues (Garfinkel, Seth, 
Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015) in different modalities 
of intuitive judgment. A prerequisite for this endeavor, 
however, is clarity about what types of feelings are 
expected to be constitutively linked to intuition and when 
they are expected to enter the process. 
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